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Sangero: Safety from Flawed Forensic Sciences Evidence

SAFETY FROM FLAWED FORENSIC SCIENCES
EVIDENCE
Boaz Sangero*
I. Introduction—Modern Safety
This article addresses the way to safety in the context of forensic
sciences evidence. After presenting the current lack of safety, which I
term “unsafety,” I raise some possible safety measures to contend
with this. My suggestions are grounded on two bases: first, the
specific analysis of each type of evidence in line with the most recent
research on the subject; and second, modern safety theory and its
application to the criminal justice system. It is important to stress that
my proposals represent only some of the conceivable safety
measures. Developing a comprehensive safety theory for the criminal
justice system will require considerable additional cross-disciplinary
research work, which I recommend be undertaken within the
framework of a Safety in the Criminal Justice System Institute
(SCJSI).1
I have chosen, for discussion purposes, to analyze the two central
types of forensic sciences evidence currently predominating criminal
law: DNA testing and fingerprint comparisons. For each of these, I
will review the most up-to-date research on the topic. I will
demonstrate why present use of these types of evidence is not errorfree and fails to ensure safety from false convictions and then offer
* Professor of Law, Founder of the Criminal Law & Criminology Department, College of Law &
Business, Ramat-Gan, Israel; and School of Law, Sapir College, Israel. I thank Prof. Rinat KitaiSangero for her tremendous help in all the stages of the writing.
1. Introducing modern safety into systems lacking a culture of safety requires the establishment of a
special institute to carry out this function, and the securing of resources necessary for the new institute
to operate in a meaningful way. Thus, for example, in the field of aviation, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) was established; in the field of transportation, the National Transportation Board
(NTSB) was founded; in the area of food and drugs, there is the Food and Drug Administration (FDA);
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) serves the occupational field; and various
such bodies were established in the medical field, such as the National Center for Patient Safety (NCPS)
and the Center for Patient Safety Research and Practice (CPSRP). In all of these fields, the recognition
of safety issues and the need to improve performance led to national focus on safety leadership, the
development of a knowledge base, and the distribution of information—an agenda to which substantial
resources were devoted.
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different ways of improving safety in these contexts. I will propose a
general solution regarding all types of forensic evidence, based on an
earlier proposition I developed with Dr. Mordechai Halpert, namely,
that the legislature must enact a rule that precludes the admissibility
of forensic evidence in court unless it has been developed as a
“safety-critical system.”2 The knowledge and solutions for
developing safety-critical devices already exists in other engineering
fields, such as medical devices and aviation devices. Thus, all that is
needed is the willingness and reasonable resources to carry this out.
Later in this article, I will offer some additional general solutions.
This article also addresses what is known as “junk science,” which
refers to evidence that is presented, inaccurately and misleadingly, as
scientific evidence when it has, at best, a flimsy connection to
science. Despite studies clearly pointing out this lack of scientific
grounding, including the 2009 National Academy of Sciences (NAS)
Report,3 some courts still admit such evidence as scientific evidence.
This is proof in itself of just how far the criminal justice system is
from being a safe system.
In certain fields, the meaning of a “safety-critical system” is well
understood, and resources are, therefore, invested in modern safety
methods that significantly reduce the rate of accidents. This is the
case, for example, in the field of pharmaceuticals and drugs, where in
the first half of the twentieth century the need for safety was already
acknowledged and internalized and the necessary powers and
authorities were granted to the FDA to ensure this. This was also the
case in the aviation field, which abandoned the obsolete “Fly-FixFly” approach in the mid-twentieth century and developed more
advanced safety methods that generally follow an “Identify-AnalyzeControl” model and are aimed at “First-Time-Safe.” The latter

2. Mordechai Halpert & Boaz Sangero, From a Plane Crash to the Conviction of an Innocent
Person: Why Forensic Science Evidence Should Be Inadmissible Unless It Has Been Developed as a
Safety-Critical System, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 65, 93–94 (2009).
3. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY.
ET AL., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (Feb. 18, 2009)
[hereinafter NAS-2009 Report].
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approach involves systematic identification of future hazards,
analysis of the probability of their occurrence, and complete
neutralization of the risk, or at least its reduction, to an acceptable
level. Modern safety approaches such as these were implemented in
other fields as well, such as transportation and engineering, and later
on, in labor and medicine. These safety systems are constructed on,
among other things, safety education and training; a culture of safety;
a duty to report not only accidents but also incidents (near-accidents);
professional risk assessment; a process of perpetual improvement;
and the understanding that safety in each component of a system
alone in detachment from the entire system is not sufficient for
achieving system safety.
Accidents also happen in the criminal justice system, of course, in
the form of false convictions. For this reason, this system must also
be classified as a safety-critical system. As systems of this type entail
matters of life and death, any system error is likely to cause severe
harm to both individuals and society at large. A false conviction is a
system error and accident just like a plane crash, not only from a
metaphorical perspective but also in the very realistic terms of
economic cost.4 Yet, in criminal law, a “Hidden Accidents Principle”
governs.5 Thus, the overwhelming majority of false convictions are
never detected, which leads to the erroneous traditional and
conservative assumption that they occur at an almost negligible rate
and that the criminal justice system is “almost” perfect.
Consequently, little thought has ever been given to safety in the
system, and therefore the criminal justice system, from a safety
perspective, lags far behind other areas of life.

4. Boaz Sangero & Mordechai Halpert, A Safety Doctrine for the Criminal Justice System, MICH.
ST. L. REV. 1293, 1304–05 (2011). The idea of incorporating into the criminal justice system a modern
safety theory that is commonly accepted in other areas—such as space, aviation, engineering, and
transportation—was developed jointly by myself and Dr. Mordechai Halpert and presented in a number
of coauthored articles, particularly A Safety Doctrine for the Criminal Justice System, id. My current
article is intended to expand on the preliminary proposition and engage in the application of the modern
safety theory in the criminal justice system, specifically regarding forensic sciences evidence. Halpert &
Sangero, supra note 2, at 93–94.
5. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1314–16.
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The patently flawed assumption of a low false-conviction rate has
been challenged in recent decades, primarily because of the work of
the Innocence Project. The Project exposes hundreds of cases of false
convictions through genetic testing and empiric studies based on the
Project’s findings, which point to a very high false-conviction rate: at
least 5% for the most serious crimes and apparently an even higher
rate for less serious crimes.6 About half of those false convictions
were based on (presumably false) forensic sciences evidence.7
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II demonstrates the current
state of unsafety in forensic sciences evidence. It starts from a
discussion of the admissibility of forensic sciences evidence, from
Frye to Daubert. It then moves to a discussion of the weight of
forensic sciences evidence, from “uniqueness,” “individualization,”
and “perfection” to empirical and probabilistic foundation. It ends
with showing why a single piece of evidence should not be sufficient
for a conviction, using Bayes’ theorem and medical diagnostics.
Then the two central types of forensic sciences evidence currently
predominating criminal law—DNA testing and fingerprint
comparisons—are discussed at length. Part II ends with a critique of
“junk science” as evidence. Part III suggests safety measures.
II. Unsafety in Forensic Sciences Evidence
A. The Admissibility of Forensic Sciences Evidence: From Frye
to Daubert
How can judges distinguish between “true” scientific evidence and
inadmissible “junk” scientific evidence? In the past, the Frye
standard, set in 1923, was the prevailing rule in American law.8
Under this rule, “general acceptance” of the method on which the
6. D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful
Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 786–88 (2007).
7. BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT—WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO
WRONG 279 fig. A.5 (2011).
8. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); BOAZ SANGERO, CONVICTING THE
INNOCENT IN ISRAEL AND IN OTHER COUNTRIES—CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS 129 (2014) (Isr.).
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evidence rests in the relevant scientific field is sufficient for it to be
admissible in court.9 This rule predominated for seventy years until it
was supplanted by a more sophisticated rule, set in 1993 by
Daubert.10 Whereas the Frye rule enabled judges to refrain from a
deep examination of the relevant scientific field and suffice with the
fact that the method in question is generally accepted by the scientific
community to which it belongs, the Daubert rule is designed to
ensure greater caution: it made judges “gatekeepers,” tasked with
blocking the entry of nonscientific evidence fraudulently presented as
scientific into the courtroom.
Daubert set four admissibility criteria for scientific evidence.11
First, the scientific method on which the evidence is allegedly based
must adhere to Karl Popper’s principle of falsifiability. That is, the
method must be empirically testable for falsifiability or refutability,
and must have been successfully tested in order to be considered
scientific methodology.12 Second, the error rate of the evidence must
be known.13 Third, the scientific method must have been subject to
peer review and published.14 And finally, similar to the requirement
under the Frye rule, the method must be accepted within the relevant
scientific community.15 As Professor Alex Stein compellingly
explained, the fourth requirement is particularly crucial: admitting
scientific evidence that does not meet the Frye standard would
undermine the allocation of the risk of error, which cannot be
contingent on a judicial prediction regarding the odds of the success
of a particular scientific progress.16

9. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
10. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–94 (1993).
11. Id.; Boaz Sangero & Mordechai Halpert, Scientific Evidence v. “Junk Science,” 11 C.L.B. L.
STUD. 425, 430 (2014) (Isr.); Kristen Bolden, DNA Fabrication, a Wake Up Call: The Need to
Reevaluate the Admissibility and Reliability of DNA Evidence, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 409, 419–24
(2011).
12. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
13. Id. at 594.
14. Id. at 593.
15. Id. at 594.
16. Alex Stein, Against Free Proof, 31 ISR. L. REV. 573, 587 (1997).
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The Daubert standard, along with certain refinements of the rule,
thus requires judges to make an effort to delve into the relevant
scientific field and to examine the reliability and validity of the
scientific method (which is, in effect, a classification system) on
which the evidence is grounded.17 “Reliability” in this context refers
to the consistency of the classification; for example, a test is reliable
if the same result will be arrived at if performed by different experts
at different points in time. “Valid” means that the method (the
classification system) is suited to the purposes for which it is used. In
the legal context, a test is valid if it suits the aim of distinguishing
between who is guilty of committing the crime in question and who
is innocent. A test can be reliable but not valid. For example, a test
that uses an arbitrary rule to distinguish between guilt and innocence
according to skin color will be a reliable test, because different
people will concur regarding the color of a defendant’s skin and color
will not alter over time. This method will not be valid, though,
because the color of a person’s skin is immaterial to the question of
his guilt or innocence. In contrast, reliability is a necessary condition
for validity: if different experts can arrive at different outcomes, or if
outcomes vary over time, then the test or method cannot be valid.
In effect, then, despite the fact that the Daubert rule takes
precedence today, the two rules—Daubert and Frye—exist side-byside in American case law.18 Generally, emphasis on the criterion of
acceptance by the relevant scientific community (the Frye test) will
lead the court to relax the requirements for recognizing the scientific
reliability of given evidence, whereas a deeper examination of the
scientific grounding and methodology of the evidence—in the spirit

17. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 431. On validity and reliability in the legal context, see
Sandy A. Zabell, Fingerprint Evidence, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 143, 154 (2005).
18. Bolden, supra note 11, at 419–24; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 431. The Daubert
standard has been adopted in federal courts, where the federal rules of evidence also apply and set a
similar arrangement. Fed. R. Evid. 702–03. For a review of the various states that have adopted the
Daubert rule as opposed to those that have continued to follow the Frye rule, see Edward K. Cheng &
Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L.
REV. 471, 472–73 (2005).
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of the Daubert rule—will lead to a more rigorous approach.19
Oftentimes, as judges struggle with the investigation of the scientific
aspects with which the Daubert rule is concerned, they incorrectly
classify methodological errors made by experts as relevant to the
weight—and not to the actual validity—of the evidence, admitting
evidence as scientific when it is not deserving of the title, at times
through resort to the Frye rule.20
One might wonder why scientific evidence in particular should be
required to meet the criteria of reliability and validity when other
types of evidence, such as witness testimony, are not. There are
several possible interrelated, cumulative answers to this.21 First,
scientific evidence is purported to be science (expert testimony is an
exception to the hearsay rule). Second, the “aura” of science can be
expected to blind judges and jurors and lead them to overestimate the
real probative strength of scientific evidence. Third, in scientific
evidence, it is more practical to require and examine reliability and
validity. And finally, fourth, the path toward implementing
appropriately rigorous standards for types of evidence that can
determine defendants’ fate must begin somewhere. The next step is
to address the remaining types of evidence and apply similar rules
and standards to them.
B. The Weight of Forensic Sciences Evidence: From
“Uniqueness,” “Individualization,” and “Perfection” to
Empirical and Probabilistic Foundation
Presumably, the different types of scientific evidence could have
been expected to greatly advance and refine criminal law and make it
more precise. There is no doubt that DNA testing and fingerprint
comparisons—despite being termed “circumstantial” evidence—are
19. David L. Faigman, Admissibility Regimes: The “Opinion Rule” and Other Oddities and
Exceptions to Scientific Evidence, the Scientific Revolution, and Common Sense, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 699,
701–703 (2008).
20. Jay P. Kesan, An Autopsy of Scientific Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 84 GEO. L.J. 1985,
2040 (1996).
21. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 432.
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far more accurate than the traditional types of evidence, referred to as
“direct” evidence: eyewitness testimony and confessions.22 Yet in the
framework of the first Innocence Project, misapplication of forensic
science is the second most common contributing factor to wrongful
convictions, found in nearly half (45%) of DNA exoneration cases.23
Moreover, as of March 2018, in the National Registry of
Exonerations, 517 of the 2,152 registered exonerations (24%)
involved false or misleading forensic evidence.24
Why is it that accurate forms of evidence can be more misleading
than other types of evidence? One possible explanation is that they
blind judges and jurors. As one defense attorney remarked, “If you
put God on the witness stand . . . and God’s testimony conflicted with
the DNA evidence, everyone would automatically say, ‘Why is God
lying like this?’”25 We all, justifiably, hold science in the highest
esteem. However, judges and jurors are not scientists. Judges are
trained jurists who are required to reach determinations on a wide
variety of issues, from all spheres of life, some of which are from the
scientific field. In present times, human knowledge is so vast that no
one has the capacity to be an expert in a number of fields, to be a
“Renaissance person.” Accordingly, judges must rely on experts who
present them with the results of scientific tests they performed. As it
is the judges and jurors—and not the experts—who are the triers of
fact, judges can and should demand experts not simply testify about
the results of the tests they performed, but describe in detail their
methodology for judges and jurors to examine. This, of course, is

22. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprints: Not a Gold Standard, 20 ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 47, 53
(2003).
23. Misapplication of Forensic Science, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
https://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/misapplication-forensic-science/ [https://perma.cc/4JNCPAVN] (last visited July 7, 2018).
24. NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS BY CONTRIBUTING FACTOR,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ExonerationsContribFactorsByCrime.aspx
[https://perma.cc/9HXC-L4LT] (last visited July 7, 2018).
25. J. Herbie DiFonzo, The Crimes of Crime Labs, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 1 (2005) (citing Laura
Lafay, Reasonable Doubt, STYLE WKLY. (July 6, 2005)
https://www.styleweekly.com/richmond/reasonable-doubt/Content?oid=1380129
[https://perma.cc/2YU8-6YT2] (quoting defense attorney David Baugh)).
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contingent on proof of the validity and reliability of the scientific
method used by the expert. Judges should require experts produce
scientific written support of their approaches, but not all judges do
so. Many rely on the experts almost blindly, to the point where, in
practice, they serve as no more than a rubber stamp.26
In addition, as the law is based on legal precedents, if a court—
especially a higher appellate court—makes the mistake of incorrectly
admitting a specific type of evidence as “scientific,” it likely sets a
precedent for other courts, which will follow the precedent without
re-examining the scientific reliability of the method. In this way, junk
science, too, could be found admissible by one court, and other courts
would follow suit without engaging in the necessary scrutiny; this is
precisely what happened over the course of many years with
microscopical hair comparisons, footprint comparisons, and voice
comparisons. Furthermore, even when (genuine) scientists find in
their research that certain allegedly “scientific” types of evidence are
not grounded in science and are unreliable and invalid, many judges,
who are used to basing convictions on such evidence, have difficulty
accepting this as it would mean conceding their own past mistakes.27
In practice, a random match is possible with every type of test
(though with DNA testing, the probability of such a match is
extremely slim). With all tests (including DNA testing), moreover,
there is a real possibility of a lab error or an error in the expert’s
interpretation of the results. In contrast to the prevailing perception of
the objectivity of all determinations in expert testimony on scientific
evidence, certain issues are in fact contingent on the expert’s
subjective interpretation of the findings.28 And indeed, the chance of
error, which always exists, combined with the fallacy of the
transposed conditional has been the underlying cause of many false
convictions.29
26. SANGERO, supra note 8, at 105–06.
27. D. Michael Risinger, Whose Fault?—Daubert, the NAS Report, and the Notion of Error in
Forensic Science, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 519, 539 (2010); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 443.
28. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 443.
29. See infra Section II.C.
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In addition, forensic lab staff work very closely with the police and
prosecution and are often even directly subordinate to them. Police
investigators supply lab workers with investigation details that are
completely irrelevant to the required lab testing, but which strengthen
the conception of the suspect’s guilt, such as the fact that a suspect
confessed or was identified by a witness. Information of this sort is
likely to bias the test results.30
Jennifer Mnookin described the current situation well:
Forensic scientists have regularly testified in courts to
matters that are, quite honestly, both less proven and less
certain than they are claimed to be. They have overstated
their degree of knowledge, underreported the chances of
error, and suggested greater certainty than is warranted.
More generally, many kinds of forensic science are not
entirely based on methods and approaches that we usually
associate with validated research science. Their claims and
the limits to their claims are not closely based on or
constrained by the formal collection of data. Their
empirical assertions are not grounded in careful research
that has been subject to peer review and publication. There
has been remarkably little formal validation of their
methods. And there has been far too little study of how
often forensic scientists might make mistakes, and when or
why these possible errors are more likely to occur.31
From the perspective of the historical development of evidence law,
every generation has realized that the weight once accorded to certain
types of evidence was excessive.32 Over the years, evidence that was
formerly held to be very strong emerges, in both the research and in
30. See Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Courts, the NAS, and the Future of Forensic Science, 75 BROOK.
L. REV. 1209, 1215 (2010); DiFonzo, supra note 25, at 4; William C. Thompson, Beyond Bad Apples:
Analyzing the Role of Forensic Science in Wrongful Convictions, 37 SW. L. REV. 1027, 1034 (2008).
31. Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1210.
32. SANGERO, supra note 8, at 47.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol34/iss4/8

10

Sangero: Safety from Flawed Forensic Sciences Evidence

2018]

FLAWED FORENSIC SCIENCES EVIDENCE

1139

practice, as not as accurate as thought. Thus, for example, we know
today that certain types of direct evidence once considered “classic”
evidence—eyewitness testimony and confessions to the police33—are
problematic and have led to many false convictions.34 During the past
century, scientific evidence has become the evidentiary “false
messiah.” To generalize, forensic scientists present scientific
evidence in court as unequivocal evidence that reflects the
uniqueness of every individual from all other human beings and
produces a perfect identification of every person. Yet this premise of
uniqueness is nothing more than pure conjecture, with no data to
support it; it is based on the assumption that nature (or God) never
repeats itself. On the one hand, it exempts forensic scientists from the
rigors of methodological research, data collection, and incidence
calculation, and on the other hand, it allows them to assert
purportedly certain identification in court. As Michael J. Saks and
Jonathan L. Koehler clarified in an article published in the leading
journal Science, “[T]he time is ripe for the traditional forensic
sciences to replace antiquated assumptions of uniqueness and
perfection with a more defensible empirical and probabilistic
foundation.”35 Moreover, they further observed elsewhere, “The
concept of individualization, which lies at the core of numerous
forensic science subfields, exists only in a metaphysical or rhetorical
sense. There is no scientific basis for the individualization claims in
forensic sciences.”36

33. The confession has even been deemed “the queen of evidence,” rather than the “empress of false
convictions” as it should be. See Boaz Sangero, Miranda Is Not Enough: A New Justification for
Demanding “Strong Corroboration” to a Confession, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2794, 2894 n.11 (2007).
34. Boaz Sangero & Mordechai Halpert, Proposal to Reverse the View of a Confession: From Key
Evidence Requiring Corroboration to Corroboration for Key Evidence, 44 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 511,
516 (2011).
35. Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification
Science, 309 SCIENCE 892, 895 (2005) [hereinafter Saks & Koehler, Forensic Identification Science].
For a more detailed discussion, see Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Individualization
Fallacy in Forensic Science Evidence, 61 VAND. L. REV. 199 (2008) [hereinafter Saks & Koehler, The
Individualization Fallacy].
36. Saks & Koehler, The Individualization Fallacy, supra note 35, at 202.
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In a later article, Koehler and Saks summarized the issue as
follows:
(1) the data necessary to achieve individualization have
never been collected for any of the forensic science
fields which aspire to individualize the source of
crime scene evidence to its sole possible contributor;
(2) the best available—and perhaps the only
scientifically defensible—approach to forensic
identification is the use of random match probability
estimates (which are not yet employed by any of the
traditional forensic identification sciences);
(3) the argument that all objects are discernibly unique
stands on little more than an oft-repeated maxim of
forensic science legend and the illusory intuition that
small frequencies imply uniqueness;
(4) probability estimates (by definition) cannot lead to
uniqueness or individualization;
(5) assertions of individualization generally exaggerate
what is known or can be accomplished by forensic
examiners.37
Thus, it emerges that with the exception of the context of DNA
comparisons, forensic experts tend to systematically violate the most
basic scientific principle that probabilistic estimates (as well as
verbal quantitative estimates) must be grounded in data.38 As Koehler
noted, “the specific language used in court by experts can be the
difference between testimony that is truly helpful and testimony that

37. See Jonathan J. Koehler & Michael J. Saks, Individualization Claims in Forensic Science: Still
Unwarranted, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1187, 1187–88 (2010); but see David H. Kaye, Probability,
Individualization and Uniqueness in Forensic Science Evidence: Listening to the Academies, 75 BROOK.
L. REV. 1163, 1166 (2010).
38. Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful
Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 19 (2009); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 445; Mnookin, supra
note 30, at 1210.
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is confusing or unhelpful.”39 Accordingly, he proposed that the
forensic linguistic community should identify clear and consistent
standards for reporting and testifying about test results, and that its
members be trained in elementary statistics and probability.40 In sum,
Koehler and Saks pointedly asserted that forensic scientists should
not be allowed “to say, in effect, ‘trust me: that’s the source.’ Real
scientists don’t say ‘trust me.’ They provide data.”41
A scientific approach, however, should be taken not only with
regard to the random match probability, but also to the possibility of
errors in lab testing. Where the possibility of a random match is very
rare (in genetic comparisons, for example, there is often a one-inmillions or even billions chance) and where the possibility of an error
in the lab testing is far more common (at least one percentage rate in
all likelihood), the courts and legislature must require that the
prosecution provide also, and even principally, the latter figure as a
condition for the admissibility of the evidence in court. This
information is very important not only with respect to admissibility
but also in terms of the correct weight to be attributed to the
evidence. Currently, there is a tendency to ignore the possibility of
error in lab testing, and consequently, scientific evidence is accorded
far greater weight than what is appropriate.42 The possibility of a lab
testing error is an inherent aspect of every scientific test. It appears
that the law is perhaps the only sphere of life in which the tendency is
to ignore this possibility. In the medical diagnostics field, for
example, the incidence of the disease in the risk group to which the
testee belongs is vital to correctly calculate the positive predictive
value of the test and not fall victim to the “base rate fallacy.”43 The

39. Jonathan J. Koehler, Linguistic Confusion in Court: Evidence from the Forensic Sciences, 21 J.
L. & POL’Y 515, 515 (2013) (emphasis omitted).
40. Id. at 537–38.
41. Koehler & Saks, supra note 37, at 1208.
42. See, e.g., Simon A. Cole, More than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Print Identification,
95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 1034 (2005).
43. See, e.g., Stuart Spitalnic, Test Properties 2: Likelihood Ratios, Bayes’ Formula, and Receiver
Operating Characteristic Curves, HOSP. PHYSICIAN, Oct. 2004, at 53, 53–54; see also infra Section II.
C.
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FDA even requires manufacturers of medical diagnostic devices to
provide the positive predictive value of the test they manufacture for
different levels of the incidence of a disease among different risk
groups.44
In the past, a common erroneous claim (referred to in the literature
as “case specific” or “false positive fallacy”)45 was that a court
presumably has no need for statistics on laboratory error rates
because it allegedly has the ability to check that all necessary
procedures were followed in the specific case before it and, thereby,
ensure that no error could have occurred.46 Today, it is generally
understood that courts are incapable of making sure that no error
occurred, and that even a negligible probability of lab error should, in
certain circumstances, result in a significant diminishment of the
weight of the relevant evidence.47 Errors occur even in the best of
laboratories and even when the experts testify that all test protocols
were followed.48
The foremost authority in scientific evidence is the 2009 NAS
Report, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path
Forward,49 which was written by an interdisciplinary panel of
distinguished scholars and practitioners. The report determined that
the forensic science system does not function properly and that a
significant improvement is required.50 Despite the fact that forensic
44. Steven Gutman, Food and Drug Administration (FDA)’s Impact on Laboratory Performance:
FDA’s Perspective, 42 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 786, 787 (1996); see also FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
STATISTICAL GUIDANCE ON REPORTING RESULTS FROM STUDIES EVALUATING DIAGNOSTIC TESTS
(Mar. 13, 2007); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 445–46.
45. William C. Thompson et al., How the Probability of a False Positive Affects the Value of DNA
Evidence, 48 J. FORENSIC SCI. 47, 51–52 (2003); see also infra Section II.C.
46. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 85 (1996)
[hereinafter NRC-II Report].
47. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 135. “However, even a very small (but nonzero) probability
of false positive can affect the odds that a suspect is the source of a sample with a matching DNA
profile.” Id. at 130; see also id. at 121 (discussing the fact that no distinction should be made between a
lab error and a random match probability error).
48. William C. Thompson, Tarnish on the “Gold Standard”: Understanding Recent Problems in
Forensic DNA Testing, 30 CHAMPION 10, 11–12, 13–14 (2006); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at
446.
49. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at i; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 446.
50. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 14–19.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol34/iss4/8

14

Sangero: Safety from Flawed Forensic Sciences Evidence

2018]

FLAWED FORENSIC SCIENCES EVIDENCE

1143

lab workers purport to engage in science, many lack the required
training to do so, and there is an inadequate connection between their
work and academic knowledge.51 This has led to significant
knowledge gaps between scientists and forensic “scientists.”52 For
the forensic science field to properly service the law, the
organizational systems and structures must be significantly upgraded,
training and qualifications improved, best practices adopted, and
accreditation programs for laboratories made mandatory. The report
emphasized that the most fundamental shortcoming emerged in the
scientific knowledge of those who work in forensic science, and it
called for genuine academic research in the area of forensic science
to be conducted at universities.53 Accordingly, the report
recommended the establishment of an independent federal agency
equipped with the necessary powers, authority, and resources to
implement fundamental changes in the area of scientific evidence.54
Obviously, such an agency would have very important ramifications
for safety.
The report also recommended removing public forensic science
laboratories from the administrative control of law enforcement
agencies and prosecutors’ offices, standardizing laboratory reports,
and instituting mandatory accreditation for all forensic laboratories,
mandatory certification for all forensic workers, and a mandatory
code of ethics.55 Another very important recommendation was to
conduct foundational research to assess the validity and reliability of
methods used in the analysis of evidence, especially pattern
evidence.56
Of particular importance to our purposes are the report chapters
that deal individually with each of the specific types of scientific
evidence. Even putting aside any possible errors on the part of

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
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NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 24–26.
Id. at 22–23.
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experts, it emerges that a considerable amount of “scientific
evidence” is not grounded in science at all. The report estimated the
scientific basis for each of the types of scientific evidence and types
of pseudoscientific evidence, beginning with genetic comparisons—
the most scientific type of evidence—and ending with junk science,
such as the microscopical hair comparisons.57 In the following
individual discussions of some of these types of evidence, I will
discard the “uniqueness,” “individualization,” and “perfection” myths
and instead present their realistic weights in light of the NAS
Report’s estimates.58
C. Why a Single Piece of (Scientific) Evidence Should Not Be
Sufficient for a Conviction: Bayes’ Theorem and Medical
Diagnostics
1. General
Under the Hidden Accidents Principle in criminal law, most false
convictions go undetected. This means that the way to safety in the
criminal justice system must be found by drawing on the insights and
experience of other fields, where accidents are observable. The
medical diagnostics field can be particularly enlightening as to how
to contend with the challenge of hidden accidents and flaws in the
system,59 as it is prominently characterized by its efforts to find ways
to diagnose rare diseases in low-risk populations, which are hard to
detect.60
Indeed, using a single piece of evidence to determine the identity
of the perpetrator of a crime can be analogized to using a single test
to diagnose a rare disease. Just as a medical doctor should not base
her diagnosis on a lone test without considering the statistical
57. Id. at 161.
58. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 447.
59. Boaz Sangero & Mordechai Halpert, Why a Conviction Should Not Be Based on a Single Piece
of Evidence: A Proposal for Reform, 48 JURIMETRICS J. 43, 51–52, 90–94 (2007).
60. Klemens B. Meyer & Stephen G. Pauker, Screening for HIV: Can We Afford the False Positive
Rate?, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 238, 239 (1987); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 34, at 529.
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implications, law enforcement agents must be aware of the
limitations of a single piece of evidence as an indicator of guilt.
2. Bayes’ Theorem As Odds
Before I describe the Bayes’ Theorem and the medical diagnostic
model, the following example can illustrate why they are so critical.61
Assume that the manufacturer of a home HIV testing kit reports an
average 0.1% false positive rate. Thus, if 10,000 non-carriers test
themselves with this kit, 10 false positive HIV results would be
obtained. Now, let us assume that John uses the kit to test himself
and gets the positive result that he is an HIV carrier. What is the
probability that he is truly a carrier? The obvious answer seems to be
99.9%, with only a 0.1% likelihood of a false positive. However, a
crucial distinction should be made between conditional probability
and inverse conditional probability: although the probability of a
positive test result for a healthy person is indeed 0.1%, of relevance
to us is the probability, given a positive test result, of the person
tested actually being a carrier.
To illustrate, further assume that John is in a low-risk group for
HIV: he practices safe sex; he does not use intravenous needles; he
has never been given a blood transfusion. Say that the HIV incidence
rate for this group is 1-in-10,000, which, in medical statistical terms,
is the base rate (incidence of the disease) for the group.62 Thus, if
10,000 people in John’s low-risk group were to test themselves using
the home HIV testing kit, eleven would get a positive result: ten
cases of error (false positives) for non-carriers (9,999 x 0.1% = ~10),
and one case of an actual HIV carrier (because 1-in-10,000 members
of this group is a carrier).63 Consequently, contrary to what most
intuitively presume, there is only a 1-in-11 (approximately 9%)
likelihood that John is an HIV-carrier if he gets a positive test result,
61. This is a modified version of an example developed in Sangero & Halpert, supra note 34, at
529–532.
62. Id. at 529.
63. Assume that there is no possibility of a false negative—that is, that there will never be a negative
test result for a carrier.

Published by Reading Room, 2018

17

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 8

1146

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:4

or, in other words, there is a probability of 10-in-11—about 91%—
that this is a false positive.64
This demonstrates how analyzing test results is not an intuitive
matter. A probabilistic analysis that considers the incidence of the
disease within the tested population will tend to show that a test that,
at first glance, appears to have precise results is in fact completely
inconclusive on its own. This failure to factor in the incidence of a
disease is a cognitive failure known in the psychological literature as
the “base-rate fallacy”65 or “base-rate neglect”66 and can be overcome
through probabilistic analysis.67
Bayes’ Theorem, which originated in the eighteenth century,68 is
very significant in applied probability theory, and can be expressed in
the form of odds:
Posterior Odds = Likelihood Ratio x Prior Odds69

This simple theorem holds that by updating our initial belief about
something with objective new information, we arrive at a new and
improved belief:70
A simple statement of Bayes’ Theorem uses three terms.
One is the prior odds of a proposition—that is, the odds as
assessed before receipt of the new evidence. The second is
the posterior odds of the proposition—that is, the odds that
the proposition is true as assessed after receipt of the new
64. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 34, at 530.
65. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Evidential Impact of Base Rates, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 153, 154 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky
eds., 1982).
66. Maya Bar-Hillel, The Base-Rate Fallacy in Probability Judgments, 44 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA
211, 211 (1980); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 65, at 154; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 50.
67. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 48.
68. Thomas Bayes, An Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances, 53 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON 370 (1763); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 49–50.
69. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 49; see also, e.g., Spitalnic, supra note 43, at 55.
70. SHARON B. MCGRAYNE, THE THEORY THAT WOULD NOT DIE: HOW BAYES’ RULE CRACKED
THE ENIGMA CODE, HUNTED DOWN RUSSIAN SUBMARINES, AND EMERGED TRIUMPHANT FROM TWO
CENTURIES OF CONTROVERSY, at xi (2011).
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evidence. And the third is the likelihood ratio. Simply
defined, the likelihood ratio of a given body of evidence
with respect to a given proposition is the ratio of the
probability that the evidence would arise given that the
proposition is true to the probability that the evidence
would arise given that the proposition is false.71
If we return to John in our example, the accuracy of the test
(99.9%) is a component of the likelihood ratio. The likelihood ratio
here is the quotient of two conditional probabilities; the numerator is
the probability that the test result will be positive given that the
person tested is a carrier, and the denominator is the probability that
the test result will be positive given that the person tested is not a
carrier. If we assume a zero-probability of a false negative (i.e., a
negative test result for a carrier), the following likelihood ratio
results:72
Likelihood Ratio = 1 / 0.001 = 1000

The Prior Odds here are the probability that a person is a carrier of
the disease divided by the probability that he is not, without taking
the test result into account. The Prior Odds for John, who is a
member of a low-risk group with a base rate of 1-in-10,000, are as
follows:
Prior Odds = 0.0001 / (1 – 0.0001) ≅ 0.000173

The Posterior Odds are the probability that a person is a carrier
divided by the probability that he is not, given a positive test result. If

71. Richard D. Friedman, A Presumption of Innocence, Not of Even Odds, 52 STAN. L. REV. 873,
875 (2000).
72. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 49.
73. Id. The denominator is supposed to complete the numerator to one, because the probability that a
person is a carrier and the probability that he is not a carrier are complementary probabilistic
occurrences. Id. at 49 n.33.
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we now insert the figures we arrived at above into Bayes’ Theorem,
the resultant odds follow:
Posterior Odds = Likelihood Ratio x Prior Odds = 1000 x 0.0001 = 0.1

John’s Posterior Odds, then, are 1-in-10: only one in eleven people
who test positive from John’s low-risk group will actually be a
carrier, while ten of the eleven positive test results will be false. This
is the same result we arrived at above without using Bayes’ Theorem
directly but by applying its underlying rationale.74
As noted, the mistaken intuition that if the home HIV test is 99.9%
accurate, that there is only a 0.1% probability that John is not a
carrier if he tests positive (as opposed to the actual 91% probability
of error), is the result of the base rate fallacy, which is also referred to
as “the fallacy of the transposed conditional”: rather than calculating
the probability that a person is not a carrier given a positive test result
(10/11 = ~91%), the probability of a non-carrier getting a positive
test result is calculated (1/1,000 = 0.1%). From a Bayesian
perspective, the source of this fallacy is that the Prior Odds are
ignored and, consequently, the Posterior Odds are equated with the
Likelihood Ratio. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky have put this
failure most succinctly: “The failure to appreciate the relevance of
prior probability in the presence of specific evidence is perhaps one
of the most significant departures of intuition from the normative
theory of prediction.”75
3. Applying Bayes’ Theorem in the Criminal Justice System
Lawyers, judges, and jurists are no less susceptible to these
cognitive fallacies, for when they are relying on a single piece of
evidence to convict a defendant, they are ignoring the Prior Odds and

74. Id. at 49–50.
75. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. REV. 237,
243 (1973); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 50.
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the important distinction between conditional probability and inverse
conditional probability.
In the criminal justice context, the given occurrence is a positive
result yielded by scientific or other evidence. The probability of a
person being a disease carrier in the medical diagnostic context is
replaced by the probability of someone being guilty of a crime in the
legal context; the probability of a person not being a carrier is
replaced by the probability of a person being innocent. In medical
diagnostics, the prior probability can be derived from the base rate; in
criminal justice, the prior probability is the judge’s (or the fact
finder’s) assessment of the defendant’s guilt or innocence based not
on the main evidence but on other evidence.76
It is important to note here the debate as to whether Bayes’
Theorem can and should be applied in criminal law, which began
with the canonical exchange between Michael O. Finkelstein,
William B. Fairley, and Laurence H. Tribe.77 I am not, however,
proposing that judges (or fact finders) apply Bayes’ Theorem to make
precise calculations to determine the cumulative weight of evidence.
What I am suggesting, rather, is that the underlying logic of the
formula be used to understand the risks of convicting a defendant
based on one piece of evidence alone (of any type) and to persuade
legislators to enact a safety rule that prohibits conviction based on a
single piece of evidence.
To illustrate, consider two hypotheses and one given event.78
Under the first hypothesis, the suspect’s Guilt (designated “G”) is
assumed, and under the second hypothesis, the suspect’s Innocence
(designated “I”) is assumed. The given event is the specific piece of
Evidence incriminating the suspect (designated “E”), which could be
76. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 51.
77. See generally Michael O. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to
Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REV. 489, 489 (1970); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics:
Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1329 (1971); see also Alex Stein,
Judicial Fact-Finding and the Bayesian Method: The Case for Deeper Skepticism About Their
Combination, 1 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 25, 25 (1996); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 52;
Edward K. Cheng, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 YALE L.J. 1254, 1254 (2013).
78. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 34, at 539–41.
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an eyewitness lineup identification or incriminating forensic lab test
results. The basic odds formula is as follows:79
Likelihood Ratio x Prior Odds = Posterior Odds

The Likelihood Ratio (also known as the Bayes’ Factor, which is
used to update our prior beliefs with the evidence that we observe)80
is the quotient of two conditional probabilities. The numerator is the
probability of the existence of the evidence assuming the suspect is
guilty, and the denominator is the probability of the existence of the
evidence assuming the suspect is innocent.81 This is the mathematical
expression of the strength of the evidence. For example, if the
incriminating evidence is an eyewitness identification in a police
lineup, then a Likelihood Ratio of ten means a likelihood the suspect
was correctly identified as the guilty culprit ten times greater than the
likelihood the suspect is innocent and mistakenly identified. But the
Likelihood Ratio is not, by itself, a sufficient indicator of a suspect’s
guilt or innocence, as it does not take into account any other evidence
aside from one specific piece of evidence, and instead presumes what
is actually yet to be proven (the numerator assumes guilt and the
denominator innocence).82
The Prior Odds are the probability of a suspect’s Guilt divided by
the probability of his Innocence without taking into consideration the
identification and the other admissible evidence.83 These odds are
called “Prior” because they reflect what we believe prior to observing
the evidence.84 Bayes’ Theorem “updates” these prior beliefs by
incorporating the evidence that we observe.85 The Posterior Odds are
then the product of the Likelihood Ratio times the Prior Odds.86 This
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 539–40.
Cheng, supra note 77, at 1267.
Sangero & Halpert, supra note 34, at 540.
Id.
Id.
Cheng, supra note 77, at 1266.
Id. at 1267.
Id.
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represents the weight of the central piece of evidence combined with
the other incriminating evidence against the suspect, expressed as
follows:87
Posterior Odds = P (Guilt│Evidence) / P (Innocence│Evidence)

When the Posterior Odds are 1, the probability of guilt is identical to
the probability of innocence (only a 50% likelihood that the suspect
is guilty). The greater the Posterior Odds, the greater the probability
of guilt.88
Elsewhere, I have demonstrated with Dr. Mordechai Halpert the
tremendous significance of not only the Likelihood Ratio but also the
Prior Odds when a single piece of evidence is the basis for a
conviction.89 If we assume a Posterior Odds threshold of ninety as the
minimum requirement for a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt,
which is the criminal law standard of proof, then about 5% of the
convictions will be false. The following table further demonstrates
the significance of the Prior Odds and the Likelihood Ratio, using
different numerical values in applying Bayes’ Theorem:90

87.
88.
89.
90.
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Table 1: Probabilities of Guilt under Bayes’ Theorem

Prior Odds

Probability of Guilt
x Likelihood Ratio = Posterior Odds Given the Evidence
(rounded out)

1
(“50:50”)

10

10:1
(10 G v. 1 I)

91%

1/10
(1 G v. 10 I)

100

10:1

91%

1/100

1,000

10:1

91%

1/1,000

10,000

10:1

91%

1/10,000

100,000

10:1

91%

1/100,000

1,000,000

10:1

91%

1/1,000,000

10,000,000

10:1

91%

1/10,000

1,000

0.1:1

9%

Table 1 demonstrates that even a slight possibility of error in a
piece of evidence leads to the practical impossibility of showing guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt based solely on that evidence (that is to
say, in the absence of any other evidence that impacts the Prior
Odds). For example, when the Prior Odds are 1-in-100,000 (or 1 in
more than 100,000) only evidence that has an error rate below 1-in1,000,000 will result in the desired Posterior Odds of 10 (probability
of guilt 91%). Yet, in reality, no evidence has or can have such a low
error rate and high level of accuracy. Moreover, the Prior Odds could
be very low, one in millions, when there is exculpatory evidence such
as an alibi. In such circumstances, for a conviction to be based upon
this evidence, the accuracy of the (scientific) evidence should be an
error rate of one error in several tens of millions of cases.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol34/iss4/8

24

Sangero: Safety from Flawed Forensic Sciences Evidence

2018]

FLAWED FORENSIC SCIENCES EVIDENCE

1153

Finally, the bottom row of the table indicates the error rate that can
be expected for realistic evidence, namely, 1-in-1,000. Thus, if the
Prior Odds of guilt are 1-in-10,000, the Posterior Odds will be a mere
0.1:1. In other words, 91% of convictions based on scientific
evidence with a 1:1000 error rate and Prior Odds of 1:10,000 will be
false.
As long as a given piece of evidence has not been shown to meet a
certain (unrealistic) very high precision requirement, it should not
constitute the sole grounds for convicting the defendant in question.
4. Insights and Lessons from the Field of Medical Diagnostics
Table 2 sets out some fundamental definitions and formulas used
in the medical diagnostic model:91
Table 2: The Generic 2 x 2 Table

Test Positive

Test Negative

Has Condition

Does Not Have
Condition

A

B

Total Positive
Tests
(A + B)

D

Total Negative
Tests
(C + D)

C

Number in Sample Number in Sample
with Condition
Without Condition
(A + C)
(B + D)

Total Number
of Subjects
(A + B + C +D)

91. With some minor modifications, the definitions, formulas, and table are from Spitalnic, supra
note 43, at 54; see also Stuart Spitalnic, Test Properties 1: Sensitivity, Specificity and Predictive Values,
HOSP. PHYSICIAN, Sept. 2004, at 27, 27.
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“Sensitivity” refers to the probability that a test will be positive
for a patient who has the tested-for condition (e.g., HIV).
Sensitivity = A / (A+C)



“Specificity” refers to the probability that a test will be
negative for a patient without the tested-for condition.
Specificity = D / (D+B)



“Positive Predictive Value” (PPV) refers to the probability that
a patient has the condition given a positive test result.
PPV = A / (A+B)



“Negative Predictive Value” (NPV) refers to the probability
that a patient does not have the condition given a negative test
result.
NPV = D / (C+D)

Professionals in the testing diagnostics and measuring device
manufacturing fields commonly use these above concepts in
describing a test’s results.92 Because of the crucial importance of the
data collected based on these concepts, FDA approval requires that
manufacturers of medical devices not only provide data on a test’s
Specificity and Sensitivity, but also on the Positive and Negative
Predictive Values for the various populations,93 and the information
must be made public.94 This is a quintessential safety measure, for, as
demonstrated above in the HIV-test example, a test may be suitable

92. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 44, at 7–8.
93. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1298.
94. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(h)(4)(B) (2012).
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for diagnosing high-risk populations but not (on its own at least) for
diagnosing low-risk groups.
It is vital that those who will engage in safety in the legal field
apply the error-prevention model developed and refined in the
medical diagnostics field. The need for this is self-evident, first and
foremost with regard to forensic evidence, which should not, in
essence, be any different from all other scientific tests. The medical
diagnostics model is suitable for weighing nonscientific evidence as
well. Had even the most basic medical diagnostics model been
adopted in the criminal justice system, it would have long arrived at
the imperative safety rule that a conviction cannot be based on a
single piece of evidence of any type. None of the types of evidence
currently accepted in criminal law is suited to this function. The
law’s disregard for this problem is one of the central causes of the
phenomenon of false convictions.
D. DNA Testing
As described in the 2009 NAS Report, “[u]nlike many forensic
techniques that were developed empirically within the forensic
[science] community, with little foundation in scientific theory or
analysis, DNA analysis is a fortuitous byproduct of cutting-edge
science.”95 And certainly, DNA has strong probative value. But not
even this type of evidence, considered the gold standard of forensic
science, is error-free.
1. Random Match Probability
The basic assumption in DNA testing is that with the exception of
identical twins, every person’s DNA is unique. However, for the
purposes of DNA forensic evidence, not all the molecules in the two
DNA samples are tested and compared.
Andrea Roth has provided a clear and detailed description of the
DNA testing process: “During forensic testing, DNA is amplified and
95. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 99.
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typed at several locations, or loci, along the genetic strand.”96 A
DNA profile consists of two genetic markers (alleles) at each locus,
representing the two alleles a person inherits from each of his two
parents at that locus.97 The main iteration of DNA-matching
technology is called Short Tandem Repeat (STR).98 The Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and state laboratories use STR to test
thirteen loci.99 The DNA analysts use a statistical table developed by
the FBI based on sample groups of approximately two hundred
people from each of four racial categories to estimate the chances of
finding each particular allele at each particular locus in the different
racial groups.100 Based on the assumption that the allelic frequencies
among the loci are independent, the analyst multiplies the 26 (13x2)
frequencies together to report for each group a “Random Match
Probability” (RMP), the probability that a random person will have
the twenty-six-allele profile.101
It is important to recall that the court is not called upon to
determine the RMP, but rather the inverse conditional probability:
namely, the probability that the two samples belong to the defendant
and that, given a match, he is indeed guilty of the crime for which he
is accused.102 To determine this probability, all the non-DNA-related
evidence must be examined, either by applying the Bayes’ Theorem
rationale or any other accepted method.103 The erroneous belief that

96. Andrea Roth, Safety in Numbers? Deciding When DNA Alone Is Enough to Convict, 85 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1130, 1135 (2010). For additional explanations of the scientific aspect of DNA testing, see
David H. Kaye, DNA Evidence: Probability, Population Genetics, and the Courts, 7 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 101, 104 (1993); FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 129–210
(3d. ed. 2011); NAT’L COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, WHAT EVERY LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICER SHOULD KNOW ABOUT DNA EVIDENCE, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/bc000614.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E55R-QUJR] (last visited July 7, 2018); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 72.
97. Roth, supra note 96, at 1135.
98. Id. at 1135–36.
99. Id. at 1136.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 72.
103. Id.; see also Roth, supra note 96, at 1156.
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the random match probability represents the probability of the
defendant’s innocence is termed the “prosecutor’s fallacy.”104
The possibility of a random match in a DNA comparison is not
particularly problematic in the context of a criminal trial, because it is
well known that this probability must be taken into account.105 Yet
because the chances of a random match are at times expressed in
astronomical terms (say, a one-in-a-billion probability of a match
between the defendant’s DNA and the crime scene DNA sample),
courts run a considerably greater risk of falsely convicting an
innocent defendant based on a DNA comparison when they ignore
the possibility of lab error (as, unfortunately, is often the case).106
The danger of error is far greater when the police have no specific
suspect whose DNA profile they can compare to the sample from the
crime scene (Verification), and instead must look for a match to one
of the (millions) of DNA profiles in the DNA database (Identification
or Database Search). This “cold hit” method can be expected to lead
to false identifications,107 and thus the results of such a database
search must not be admissible as evidence but, rather, serve only as a
means for finding suspects. Once a suspect is found, other significant
evidence connecting him to the crime should be searched for; in the
absence of such evidence, the suspect should be acquitted if brought
to trial.108 An important question, beyond the scope of this article, is
what boundaries should be imposed on such database searches under
Fourth Amendment protections.109
104. Koehler, supra note 39, at 521.
105. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 73.
106. People v. Reeves, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728, 753 (2001) (“[B]ecause appellant has not presented
persuasive evidence of an ongoing controversy in the scientific community, we conclude that the NRC’s
recommendation is generally accepted, and DNA probability calculations need not be modified to
account for a laboratory error rate.”); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 79.
107. But see Rick Visser, When DNA Won’t Work, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 39, 41 (2012).
108. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 53; see also Roth, supra note 96, at 1134. The author
suggests a threshold of a 99.9% source probability (1-in-1,000) as satisfying the “beyond a reasonable
doubt” requirement. Id. at 1168. I believe that this is not sufficient, as it relates only to the possibility of
a random match and almost completely neglects the much greater possibility of a laboratory error.
109. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465–66 (2013); David H. Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory
of Arrestee DNA and Other Biometric Databases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1095, 1096 (2013); David H.
Kaye, Why So Contrived? Fourth Amendment Balancing, Per Se Rules, and DNA Databases after
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The use of partial DNA profiles is another problem in this context.
Although the current U.S. standard is to test thirteen loci to arrive at a
twenty-six-allele profile, partial DNA profiles containing fewer
alleles can also be searched against profiles in databases110 (such as
the FBI’s Combined DNA Index System).111 Using such partial DNA
evidence to support prosecuting someone the police have identified
as a suspect, particularly when other evidence already points to his
guilt, is, in itself, not objectionable. Problems arise, however, when
police reverse the order of their investigative methodology: when
investigators screen a partial genetic profile against DNA profiles
data to “trawl” for potential suspects, rather than matching the partial
DNA profile taken from the crime scene against an already-identified
suspect.112 As Michael Naughton and Gabe Tan explain, three
hazards arise.113 First, there is no way to estimate with sufficient
certainty a match between the suspect’s profile and the crime -scene
profile if the latter is not complete.114 The authors illustrate this with
the example of Raymond Easton, whose six STR markers matched
the crime scene profile, but later on, when four other loci were tested,
none was a fit.115 Second, the match probability increases
significantly with a partial profile, and thus, speculative searches of
partial crime scene profiles against DNA profiles in databases often
produce multiple “matches.”116 Third, this problem makes innocent
individuals whose DNA profiles are in the database more vulnerable
to becoming suspects for a crime they did not commit and,
accordingly, being falsely convicted.117

Maryland v. King, 104 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 535, 535 (2014); Catherine W. Kimel, DNA Profiles,
Computer Searches, and the Fourth Amendment, 62 DUKE L.J. 993, 993 (2013); Erin Murphy, License,
Registration, Cheek Swab: DNA Testing and the Divided Court, 127 HARV. L. REV. 161, 161 (2013).
110. Michael Naughton & Gabe Tan, The Need for Caution in the Use of DNA Evidence to Avoid
Convicting the Innocent, 15 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 245, 251–53 (2011).
111. See NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 100.
112. Naughton & Tan, supra note 110, at 252.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 252–53.
116. Id. at 253.
117. Id.
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In an Arizona forensics laboratory in 2001, analysts found a nineSTR locus match between two unrelated individuals.118 The random
match probability for a match of a nine-locus genotype in Arizona
was “1 in 754 million in Caucasians” and “1 in 561 billion in African
Americans.”119 In 2005, during proceedings in an Arizona court in a
case in which the state had only typed nine loci, a DNA analyst
testifying for the defense stated that she had found approximately
ninety nine-locus, partial matches in a relatively small database with
only 65,493 entries.120 These findings seem to contradict the usual
court testimony of forensic experts, who tend to estimate the RMP as
one in millions, billions, or trillions.121 Keith Devlin, a
mathematician at Stanford University, dismisses the extreme RMP
numbers presented in courts as “nonsense” and “lies.”122 Moreover,
some defense lawyers and researchers requested access to convictedoffender databases (such as the FBI’s CODIS and the National DNA
Index System, or NDIS) to empirically test the theoretical
estimates.123 In response, the FBI threatened that if states opened
their databases to external scientists or defendants, the FBI would
terminate their participation in the national database system.124 In his
article, Trawling DNA Databases for Partial Matches: What Is the
FBI Afraid Of?, David Kaye observed as follows:
[T]he release of the data, stripped of personal identifiers,
for population-genetics research is permissible . . . the FBI
has nothing to fear and should reverse its policy of not
researching the issue and maintaining the secrecy of the
data . . . the public and the legal community need to know
that all reasonable efforts have been made to verify the
118. David H. Kaye, Trawling DNA Databases for Partial Matches: What Is the FBI Afraid Of?, 19
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 145, 153 (2009).
119. Id. at 154.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 155.
122. Id. at 148.
123. Id. at 149.
124. Kaye, supra note 118, at 149.
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accuracy of the numbers that are given to police, judges,
and juries. Disclosure of the databases in anonymized form
is the best policy.125
I agree with Kaye. A few researchers, including Bruce Weir and
Laurence Mueller, have used simulations with databases in their
research.126 But the databases available to these researchers are
relatively small.127 I contend that conducting expanded simulations
on the NDIS would be an important safety tool for the criminal
justice system. Indeed, people should not be judged and sentenced to
jail based on theories and RMP calculations alone when we can
verify (using strong computers) the exact RMP for each number of
loci in a profile.
Last, another significant problem is that many crime scene DNA
samples contain a mixture of DNA from two or more people. This
could also lead to the false identification of an innocent suspect as the
perpetrator of the crime being investigated.128 Indeed, the title of
Naughton and Tan’s article frames this concern in the very terms that
underlie the objective of this article: “The Need for Caution in the
Use of DNA Evidence to Avoid Convicting the Innocent.”129
A recent special report to the President discussed this problem of a
mixture of DNA from two or more people.130 The report
distinguishes sharply between DNA analysis of single-source and
simple-mixture samples and DNA analysis of complex-mixture
samples.131 In the first category, DNA analysis “is an objective
method in which the laboratory protocols are precisely defined and
the interpretation involves little or no human judgement” (although

125. Id. at 150.
126. Id. at 161.
127. Id. at 155.
128. Naughton & Tan, supra note 110, at 254–55.
129. Id. at 245.
130. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH.,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY
OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 7 (2016).
131. Id. at 7–8.
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“errors can and do occur . . . sample mix-ups, contamination,
incorrect interpretation, and errors in reporting”), whereas “subjective
analysis of complex DNA mixtures has not been established to be
foundationally valid and is not a reliable methodology.”132
2. Laboratory Error
There is a significant risk of false conviction with DNA evidence
due to the strong tendency to ignore the huge impact of a possible lab
error in the DNA testing. The NAS 2009 report corrected this
dangerous omission,133 but as I will demonstrate, court verdicts have
yet to reflect this.
The relatively recent use of genetic comparisons as scientific
evidence in criminal trials did not emerge until the 1980s.134 When
attorneys first began to submit evidence from DNA testing in court,
forensic experts claimed absolute reliability and zero probability of
error in the tests.135 Yet Koehler has rightly called for a distinction
between a DNA match and a report of a DNA match based on their
differing probabilities of error.136 Indeed, the National Academy of
Sciences found that:
Although DNA laboratories are expected to conduct their
examinations
under
stringent
quality
controlled
environments, errors do occasionally occur. They usually
involve situations in which interpretational ambiguities
occur or in which samples were inappropriately processed
and/or contaminated in the laboratory. Errors also can
occur when there are limited amounts of DNA, which
132. Id. The report describes efforts to develop computer programs that apply various algorithms to
interpret complex mixtures in an objective manner and recommends development of objective methods.
Id. at 78.
133. See NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 132.
134. Kaye, supra note 96, at 101; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 72.
135. Thompson et al., supra note 45, at 47–48.
136. Jonathan J. Koehler, On Conveying the Probative Value of DNA Evidence: Frequencies,
Likelihood Ratios, and Error Rates, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 859, 868–69 (1996); Sangero & Halpert, supra
note 59, at 73.
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limits the amount of test information and increases the
chance of misinterpretation. Casework reviews of mtDNA
analysis suggest a wide range in the quality of testing
results that include contamination, inexperience in
interpreting mixtures, and differences in how a test is
conducted.137
Research has shown that a wide variety of factors can account for
errors in DNA testing.138 For example, cross-contamination and
sample mix-ups can be chronic occurrences at even the best DNA
laboratories.139 The hazards and risks increase with Polymerase
Chain Reaction (PCR) typing methods,140 which entail the
duplication of a small amount of DNA to produce a larger amount
sufficient for conducting the DNA test.141 Here, even minute
contamination of the small sample is likely to be dangerously
amplified into a significant contamination of the enlarged sample,
which biases the test results. Errors can occur at any phase of the
testing, beginning with the sample-collecting stage and through to the
actual test itself.142 In addition, the test involves subjective
interpretation of lines that appear at its conclusion,143 and an
incorrect interpretation is likely to yield an erroneous result.144 Even

137. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 132.
138. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 73.
139. Thompson, supra note 48, at 11.
140. Naughton & Tan, supra note 110, at 247; NRC-II Report, supra note 46, at 83–84.
141. The definition of PCR given in the FBI Standards for DNA Quality Assurance Standards for
Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories (2009) is as follows:
Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) is an enzymatic process by which a specific region of DNA is
replicated during repetitive cycles which consist of the following: (1) denaturation of the template; (2)
annealing of primers to complementary sequences at an empirically determined temperature; and (3)
extension of the bound primers by a DNA polymerase.
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, QUALITY ASSURANCE STANDARDS FOR FORENSIC DNA TESTING
LABORATORIES 6 (2011), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/quality-assurance-standards-for-forensicdna-testing-laboratories.pdf/view [https://perma.cc/6QKJ-ZHHU] [hereinafter FBI Standards for DNA].
142. NRC-II Report, supra note 46, at 87.
143. William C. Thompson et al., Evaluating Forensic DNA Evidence: Essential Elements of a
Competent Defense Review: Part 1, 27 CHAMPION 16, 18 (2003); NRC-II Report, supra note 46, at 84–
85.
144. NRC-II Report, supra note 46, at 84–85.
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the most human of errors, such as mislabeling samples, are possible
in the best laboratories and even when the lab workers are certain that
they have taken every precaution against error.145
Some of the risks of scientific evidence are similar to those that
arise with medical diagnostic tests,146 but while the FDA fully
regulates manufacturers of medical diagnostic devices, there is no
such regulation of manufacturers of scientific evidence equipment,
including DNA testing equipment, despite the many risks entailed.147
For example, there is no error reporting duty for DNA testing
equipment, which is accepted practice in safety-critical systems.148
This lack of duty leads to unsafety.149
An illustrative example is the user manual Applied Biosystems
supplies with the DNA testing kits it manufactures,150 which states as
follows in bold lettering: “For Research, Forensic and Paternity Use
Only. Not for use in diagnostic procedures.”151 What this means is
that the same, lone piece of evidence that is a sufficient basis for
convicting and sentencing someone to an extended prison term or
even death is insufficient foundation for a medical diagnosis.152 Not
145. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 89 (1992). For a deeper
discussion of the causes of error, see Naughton & Tan, supra note 110, at 246–47; Thompson et al.,
supra note 45, at 1; James Herbie DiFonzo, In Praise of Statutes of Limitations in Sex Offense Cases, 41
HOUS. L. REV. 1205, 1233–61 (2004).
146. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1305.
147. See François Pompanon et al., Genotyping Errors: Causes, Consequences and Solutions, 6
NATURE REV. GENETICS 847, 852–53 (2005); Thompson et al., supra note 45, at 10, 14. The FBI’s
Quality Assurance Standards for Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories is important, but the only standard
for DNA kits is imposed on laboratories and not manufacturers. FBI Standards for DNA, supra note
141, at 19 (“Standard 9.3[:] The laboratory shall identify critical reagents and evaluate them prior to use
in casework. These critical reagents shall include but are not limited to the following: [] Test kits or
systems for performing quantitative PCR and genetic typing.”).
148. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1305.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1306.
151. APPLIED BIOSYSTEMS, AMPFLSTR IDENTIFILER, PCR AMPLIFICATION KIT: USER’S MANUAL, at
ii (2001), http://projects.nfstc.org/workshops/resources/literature/Ampflstr_Identifiler_users_manual.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6PEQ-LD5M]. The warning was recently slightly modified to “For Forensic or
Paternity Use Only.” APPLIED BIOSYSTEMS, AMPFLSTR SGM PLUS PCR AMPLIFICATION KIT: USER’S
MANUAL
2
(2012),
http://www3.appliedbiosystems.com/cms/groups/applied_markets_support/documents/generaldocument
s/cms_041049.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5N9-7Q6R].
152. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1306.
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surprisingly, problems with Applied Biosystems software have
emerged,153 and it seems that the software was never approved by the
FDA.154
Accidents and incidents are not a rare phenomenon in DNA
testing.155 Exemplifying this is the widespread contamination
discovered at the British Forensic Service. Researchers found that the
DNA of twenty employees of the microfuge tubes manufacturer had
contaminated the DNA evidence in scores of cases,156 reporting that
contamination had been found in approximately 10% of scenes.157 A
similar case arose in Germany. In 2008, the German police offered a
100,000 Euro award for information leading to the arrest of a serial
killer known as the “Phantom of Heilbronn.”158 Traces of her DNA
had been found at some forty crime scenes in Germany, Austria, and
France, six of them murders.159 In 2009, it was revealed that in fact
there had never been a serial killer, and instead, the DNA found at all
the crime scenes belonged to an innocent female worker at the
Bavarian factory that manufactures the cotton swabs used in the
DNA collection.160 The swabs had been contaminated with her
DNA.161
Of course, optimists will maintain that the worst-case scenario of
such cases of contamination is not the false accusation of an innocent

153. Jason R. Gilder et al., Systematic Differences in Electropherogram Peak Heights Reported by
Different Versions of the GeneScan Software, 49 J. FORENSIC SCI. 92, 95 (2004); Sangero & Halpert,
supra note 4, at 1306.
154. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1306.
155. Id.
156. Kevin Sullivan et al., New Developments and Challenges in the Use of the UK DNA Database:
Addressing the Issue of Contaminated Consumables, 146 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 175, 176 (2004) (cited in
Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1306).
157. Id.
158. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1307; Reward for “Phantom Killer” Reaches Record
€300,000, LOCAL (Jan. 13, 2009, 4:55 PM), http://www.thelocal.de/national/20090113-16739.html
[https://perma.cc/5NSN-M5LE]; David H. Kaye, Commentary, GINA’s Genotypes, 108 MICH. L. REV.
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 51, 52 (2010).
159. Kaye, supra note 158, at 52; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1307.
160. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1307.
161. Reward for “Phantom Killer” Reaches Record €300,000, supra note 158; Kaye, supra note 158,
at 52; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1307.
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person, but that the actual perpetrator remains at large.162 But this is
flawed thinking from the perspective of safety. First, safety in DNA
testing could reduce the risk of false negatives, which are what allow
the actual perpetrators to roam free. Second, safety in DNA testing
would also reduce the risk of false positives that result from the
relatively easy and undetectable sample contamination. A primary
hazard is cross-contamination between the genetic matter of an
innocent suspect (or someone who becomes a suspect after the DNA
test) and the DNA sample taken from a crime scene, which leads to
the mistaken conclusion that the suspect committed the crime.163
In some cases, cross-contamination can lead to a false conviction,
which almost occurred in the Jaidyn Leskie murder investigation164
and the Russell John Gesah case,165 and actually occurred in the
Farah Jama case.166 A prominent case in which cross-contamination
almost led to a false conviction is that of Jack Bellamy, a convicted
sex offender who was charged with the murder of Jane Durrua. In
2004, a DNA sample taken during the 1968 murder investigation was
found to match Bellamy’s DNA.167 It later emerged, however, that
162. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1307.
163. Thompson, supra note 48, at 10–12; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1307.
164. In the Jaidyn Leskie murder investigation, DNA samples taken from a young, “mentally
challenged” girl matched the samples taken from the murder scene. GRAEME JOHNSTONE, INQUEST INTO
THE DEATH OF JAIDYN RAYMOND LESKIE, CORONERS CASE NO. 007/98 64–65 (2006) (Austl.),
http://darwin.bio.uci.edu/~mueller/pdf/leskie_decision.pdf [https://perma.cc/C657-ABJM]. It emerged
in the coroner’s inquiry that a sex crime committed against the girl had been investigated by the same
laboratory that had tested the blood stains from the murder, which occurred around the same time. Id. at
67–70. The coroner’s final conclusion was that there had been cross-contamination between the girl’s
DNA and the DNA sample from the Leskie murder scene. Id. at 70–72, 85. The coroner noted that
additional instances of contamination had been discovered at the same laboratory. Id. at 85; Sangero &
Halpert, supra note 4, at 1307–08.
165. In 2008, murder charges brought against Russell John Gesah based on DNA test results were
dropped when it emerged that his DNA sample and the sample from the crime scene had been processed
at the same time and by the same laboratory, raising cross-contamination concerns. Sangero & Halpert,
supra note 4, at 1307–08.
166. Farah Jama was convicted and sentenced to six years in prison. FRANK H.R. VINCENT, REPORT:
INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT LED TO THE CONVICTION OF MR. FARAH ABDULKADIR JAMA
13 (2010) (Austl.), https://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/papers/govpub/VPARL2006-10No301.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GYJ2-7KW6]. Jama served about a year and a half until the prosecutor informed the
court, in 2009, that the DNA sample had apparently been contaminated. Id. at 46. The court vacated the
conviction, and Jama was released from prison. Id. at 47; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1308.
167. Robert Hanley, DNA Leads to Arrest in ‘68 Rape and Murder of Girl, N.Y. TIMES (June 17,
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the same laboratory processed Bellamy’s original DNA sample and
the sample from the Durrua investigation at the same time, giving
serious reason to suspect cross-contamination,168 and leading the
prosecutor to drop the charges against Bellamy. Finally, in 2008,
different results were achieved when the samples were tested by
other laboratories, after which charges were filed against a new
suspect, Robert Zarinsky, for the same murder.169
Not all DNA testing errors are detected. In the case of John Ruelas
and Gary Lieterman, for example, their DNA samples were found to
match DNA found at a 1969 murder crime scene.170 Ruelas, who had
been four years old at the time of the murder, was clearly not the
perpetrator.171 Lieterman, in contrast, was convicted of the murder,
despite the lack of a reasonable explanation for the match between
Ruelas’ DNA and the DNA at the crime scene, and disregarding the
fact that the sample from the victim and samples from the two
suspects were processed in the same laboratory at the same time.172
Given the Hidden Accidents Principle in criminal law, had Ruelas
been an adult and not a child at the time of the murder, he would
likely have been falsely convicted and the probability of crosscontamination never revealed.173
The media often reports on DNA testing mishaps, but does not
always provide accurate information in doing so.174 And as there is
no reporting duty or duty to investigate DNA testing accidents—let
alone incidents—the media is often the exclusive source of this
information.175 Consequently, again, not only does the criminal
2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/17/nyregion/dna-leads-to-arrest-in-68-rape-and-murder-of-girl13.html?sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/2TUG-6YT2]; Sangero & Halpert, supra note
4, at 1308.
168. William C. Thompson, The Potential for Error in Forensic DNA Testing (and How That
Complicates the Use of DNA Databases for Criminal Identification), COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE
GENETICS 28–29 (2008).
169. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1308.
170. Thompson, supra note 48, at 14; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1308–09.
171. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1308.
172. Id. at 1309.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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justice system lack a safety approach for preventing accidents, but it
also makes no consistent attempt to learn from experience; that is, not
even the outdated Fly-Fix-Fly method is applied in criminal law in a
systematic fashion.176
William C. Thompson has reported on the considerable errors and
problems in how DNA laboratories are managed in the United States
and elsewhere in both confirmation cases and “cold hit” database
searches.177 His findings are based on laboratory records and point to
an unexpectedly high rate of detected cases of mislabeling and
sample contamination.178 Although the particular instances of
laboratory contamination Thompson recorded were uncovered at
early stages, he nonetheless noted that they raise grounds for concern,
because cross-contamination is a regular occurrence even in the toprated laboratories and “the same processes that cause detectable
errors in some cases can cause undetectable errors in others.”179
Thompson noted that “[e]rrors that incriminate a suspect are unlikely
to be detected as errors; they are likely to be treated as incriminating
evidence.”180 He also considered the possibility of lab workers
falsifying test results to cover up contamination incidents, which “can
be the result of negligence, and cost a [lab] worker his job.”181
Koehler, in turn, has reported on professional proficiency tests that
were not blind.182 “The error rates in these tests were tremendous,
varying between 1% and 4%.”183 Section II.C shows the tremendous
significance of such an error rate. Moreover, Koehler, Audrey Chia,
and Samuel Lindsey claimed that when the probability of a
laboratory error is much greater than the RMP, the latter probability

176. Id.
177. Thompson, supra note 48, at 11.
178. Id. at 13.
179. Id. at 12.
180. Id.
181. Id.; see also Richard O. Lempert, After the DNA Wars: A Mopping Up Operation, 31 ISR. L.
REV. 536, 552–53 (1997); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 75.
182. Jonathan J. Koehler, Error and Exaggeration in the Presentation of DNA Evidence, 34
JURIMETRICS J. 21, 25–26 (1993); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 75–76.
183. Koehler, supra note 182, at 26; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 75.
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is insignificant and the former probability is the relevant statistic.184
To illustrate, an RMP of 1-in-100-million creates a bias against the
defendant, even if the probability of a laboratory error is 1%, because
the RMP is the only statistic the jury hears. It is therefore preferable
not to report the RMP to the jury. In a later article, Koehler made the
recommendation—which I fully support—that the jury instructions
on the possibility of an error in the testing include only one statistic,
relating to both the RMP and lab error combined.185
Another claim Koehler raised is that the average error rate of all
forensic laboratories should be considered in the absence of statistics
regarding the error rate of the laboratory that performed the actual
testing.186 I take the further step, however, of maintaining that the
absence of statistical data on the error rate of the relevant laboratory
should render its test results inadmissible as criminal evidence given,
among other things, the Daubert rule. Alternatively, if the court
nonetheless admits the results as evidence, safety considerations
mandate that the error rate of the relevant laboratory be assumed to
be at the highest level for laboratories of the same type.187
It has been claimed that retesting can reduce the error rate,
particularly if it is performed by a different laboratory,188 but this
would not reduce the error rate to zero. First of all, the same cause of
error in the first round of testing could quite possibly reoccur in the
retesting at the second laboratory;189 indeed, different laboratories
have been known to make the same mistakes.190 There are a variety
of reasons for the same mistake to be repeated in different
laboratories, including the erroneous analysis of the lines obtained in
184. Jonathan J. Koehler et al., The Random Match Probability in DNA Evidence: Irrelevant and
Prejudicial?, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 201, 210–11 (1995); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 76.
185. Koehler, supra note 39, at 533.
186. Jonathan J. Koehler, Why DNA Likelihood Ratios Should Account for Error (Even When a
National Research Council Report Says They Should Not), 37 JURIMETRICS J. 425, 433 (1997).
187. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 76. A similar claim was raised in Barry C. Scheck, DNA
and Daubert, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1959, 1981–85 (1994).
188. NRC-II Report, supra note 46, at 37; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 78.
189. David J. Balding, Errors and Misunderstandings in the Second NRC Report, 37 JURIMETRICS J.
469, 475 (1997).
190. Koehler, supra note 186, at 437; Thompson et al., supra note 45, at 2.
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the test and contamination of the sample before the first test.191
Another problem is that the first laboratory sometimes uses up all of
the sample material, making retesting impossible.192
Despite this, retesting could still prevent certain laboratory errors
that lead to false convictions. Thus, as a necessary safety procedure, a
legal rule should be passed requiring retesting DNA samples by an
independent, objective expert as a condition for basing a conviction
on DNA testing lab results.193 However, DNA evidence should not
suffice alone for convictions, because performing a second test will
not neutralize altogether the significant risk of error.
Finally, Israeli researchers exposed the possibility of DNA
fabrication as another source of concern when they created artificial
DNA that can fool current forensic testing procedures.194 Following
this, it was suggested that “the discovery of the ability to easily
fabricate DNA evidence as well as a long history of DNA
falsification and gross ineptness by crime laboratories demonstrate
that DNA-based evidence’s sterling reputation is undeserved.”195
3. Summary and Recommendations
Although it is undisputed that DNA evidence is significant,
weighty evidence that the courts must rely on, it must not be allowed
to constitute the sole basis for a conviction in a criminal trial, because
sole reliance creates a tangible danger that the conviction will be
wrongful.196
Indeed, as discussed, the likelihood of a lab error in DNA testing
tends to be considered in detachment from the other evidence in a
191. Thompson et al., supra note 45, at 48.
192. This was common practice in the Houston police crime laboratory. DiFonzo, supra note 145, at
1248; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 78.
193. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 21.
194. D. Frumkin et al., Authentication of Forensic DNA Samples, 2009 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L.:
GENETICS 1, 1; Bolden, supra note 11, at 409.
195. Bolden, supra note 11, at 440–41 (“[C]ourts should evaluate DNA evidence on a case-by-case
basis, evaluating the authenticity of the DNA evidence as well as the testing procedures used to obtain
the results.”).
196. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 80.
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case,197 even though such errors are unavoidable and the court has no
way of determining whether these errors occurred in the specific case
at issue. Not even retesting in another laboratory will fully fix this
problem. Moreover, although the probability of a lab error (which
may occur in 1 in 100 cases) is much higher than the RMP, juries are
not supplied with this statistic and instead hear only the impressive
RMP statistic (which could amount to one-in-a-billion or even trillion
cases).
Because there are no adequate statistics on the error rates of
different laboratories, the prosecution should bear the burden of
establishing these rates regarding the specific laboratory that
performed the testing upon which the prosecution relies.198 Above I
suggested two alternative safety mechanisms when there is a lack of
data on a specific laboratory; the court must either find the evidence
inadmissible or admit it while ascribing the highest known rate of
error for tests performed in laboratories of the relevant sort.
In 2009, the FBI released its Quality Assurance Standards for
Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories.199 These groundbreaking
standards, based partially on the recommendations in the NAS
reports,200 include requirements for protocols regarding, among other
things, the interpretation of DNA, mixed samples, and
contamination.201 Also included are important standards relating to
quality assurance programs, education and training of laboratory
personnel, lab reports, lab reviews, proficiency testing, and corrective

197. Id. at 79.
198. Id.
199. Revised Quality Assurance Standards, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH.,
https://strbase.nist.gov/revisedQAS.htm [https://perma.cc/283A-3DEW] (last visited July 7, 2018). For
the Quality Assurance Standards currently in force, see FBI Standards for DNA, supra note 141.
200. See FBI Standards for DNA, supra note 141, at 20 (“Standard 9.6[:] The laboratory shall have
and follow written guidelines for the interpretation of data. [] For a given population(s), the statistical
interpretation of autosomal loci shall be made following the recommendations 4.1, 4.2 or 4.3 as deemed
applicable of the National Research Council report entitled ‘The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence’
(1996) and/or court directed method.”)
201. Id. at 20–21 (Standards 9.6 and 9.7).
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action when discrepancies are detected in proficiency tests and
casework analysis.202
Although this is important progress, these are only the first steps
forward, as these standards should be mandatory for each and every
federal and state laboratory. This has the potential to be an effective
safety program, but to achieve this the standards must not simply
require that labs formulate their own protocols, the standards must
instead actually formulate in detail—and enforce—the necessary
protocols.
In addition, a regulatory regime similar to the mandatory
premarket approval process for medical diagnostic devices should be
instituted for manufacturers of scientific evidence devices, including
DNA kits.203 This regime should impose an accident-reporting duty
as well as a duty to report incidents that involve accuracy, similar to
the arrangement for medical devices. This would supplement and
support existing safety recommendations relating to accreditation of
laboratories, as set forth in the 2009 NAS Report.204
Another important way to ensure safety in the context of DNA
testing and evidence is the performance of extended simulations on
the NDIS. Using strong computers, researchers should verify and
find out the exact RMP for each number of loci in a profile. Finally,
the above-mentioned recommendation of the Report to the President
(2016) should be adopted: to develop objective methods of
interpreting complex DNA mixtures.205
E. Fingerprint Comparisons
1. The Possibility of Error
There are four stages to the basic approach of latent fingerprint
experts, known as ACE-V: Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and
202.
203.
204.
205.
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See NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 195.
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Verification.206 In the analysis stage, the examiner closely examines
the latent print associated with the crime being investigated and
decides whether there is enough useful information contained in the
image to make it “of value” for further examination.207 If there is, the
examiner marks up the print and documents the minutiae he or she
observes.208 In the comparison stage, the analyst compares the latent
print to a particular source print, noting observed similarities and
differences.209 In the evaluation stage, the expert reaches one of three
possible conclusions: exclusion, identification, or inconclusive.210 If
the first expert reaches an identification conclusion, then a second
expert conducts the same process in the verification stage.211
Fingerprint evidence has long been considered very strong
evidence.212 Throughout the twentieth century, both courts and the
general public regarded it as the epitome of reliable and certain
evidence, and it served as a basis for many convictions.213 Yet in
recent years, this special status has become the subject of criticism
for not being grounded in solid statistical theory and for being subject
to error.214
As discussed above, general consensus exists as to the possibility
of a random match in a DNA comparison so that all of the loci
compared in a test will be identical for a number of people. For this
206. Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1217.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1217–18.
210. Id. at 1218.
211. Id.
212. Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1217 (“Fingerprint evidence is, in all likelihood, both more probative
and less error-prone than some other kinds of forensic identification evidence, and it has a long and
extremely substantial courtroom use.”).
213. Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint “Science” Is Revealed, 75
S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 605 n.3 (2002); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 63.
214. Epstein, supra note 213, at 622; Zabell, supra note 17, at 152; Nathan Benedict, Fingerprints
and the Daubert Standard for Admission of Scientific Evidence: Why Fingerprints Fail and a Proposed
Remedy, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 519, 526–33 (2004); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in the Age of
DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 13, 57–61 (2001); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 63–64;
Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1209–10; Elizabeth J. Reese, Techniques for Mitigating Cognitive Biases in
Fingerprint Identification, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1252, 1255–56 (2012); Brandon Garrett & Gregory
Mitchell, How Jurors Evaluate Fingerprint Evidence: The Relative Importance of Match Language,
Method Information, and Error Acknowledgment, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 484, 485 (2013).
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reason, the test results are given in statistical form: in a population of
X million people, on average, Y persons will share the same genetic
profile. However, the prevailing assumption regarding fingerprint
comparisons is that every fingerprint is unique and there is zero
possibility of a random match.215 Consequently, courts tend not to
require random match data for fingerprints and the prosecution
therefore does not present any such data during trial. In effect, no
data addresses this possibility,216 and there is no scientific proof that
it is impossible for two people to have the same points of comparison
in a fingerprint examined by an expert.217 Forensic experts testifying
in court present this evidence as unequivocal instead of making an
effort to investigate and provide data about Random Match
Probability. This testimony leads jurors to perceive this evidence as
far stronger than it actually is.218
A 2002 study arrived at a 6.10×10−8 probability of a fingerprint
with thirty-six minutiae points sharing twelve minutiae points with
another arbitrarily chosen fingerprint with thirty-six minutiae
points.219 Thus, some statistical theories have found a possibility of a
random match between fingerprints, similar to cases with DNA
comparisons.220 Examiners comparing two different peoples’
fingerprints may find them so similar that they cannot distinguish
between them.221
215. See generally David J. Balding & Peter Donnelly, Inferring Identity from DNA Profile Evidence,
92 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 11741 (1995); Peter Donnelly & Richard D. Friedman, DNA Database
Searches and the Legal Consumption of Scientific Evidence, 97 MICH. L. REV. 931 (1999); see also
Thompson et al., supra note 45, at 49–51; William C. Thompson & Simon A. Cole, Psychological
Aspects of Forensic Identification Evidence, in EXPERT PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY FOR THE COURTS
31, 56 (Mark Costanzo et al. eds., 2007); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 64–65.
216. See Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1221–27; Zabell, supra note 17, at 155–56.
217. Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1225; Sharath Pankanti et al., On the Individuality of Fingerprints,
24 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PATTERN ANALYSIS & MACHINE INTELLIGENCE 1010, 1011 (2002).
218. Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1226; Saks & Koehler, Forensic Identification Science, supra note
35, at 893; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 64.
219. Pankanti et al., supra note 217, at 1021; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 64.
220. Cedric Neumann et al., Computation of Likelihood Ratios in Fingerprint Identification for
Configurations of Three Minutiae, 51 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1255, 1255 (2006).
221. This was proven in the Brandon Mayfield case, discussed supra Section II.E.(2). See Sarah
Kershaw et al., Spain and U.S. at Odds on Mistaken Terror Arrest, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/05/us/spain-and-us-at-odds-on-mistaken-terror-arrest.html

Published by Reading Room, 2018

45

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 8

1174

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:4

In the early 1990s, British researchers examined the sixteen-point
standard for comparing fingerprints followed in England and
Wales.222 Their research findings showed the subjective nature of
fingerprint analysis: different examiners arrived at entirely different
points and numbers of comparison.223 The results of proficiency tests
for 156 fingerprint examiners, conducted in the United States under
the auspices of the International Association for Identification and
published in 1996, reinforced this outcome.224 These results shocked
the forensic science community: of the 156 examiners tested, only
sixty-eight had both correctly identified the five latent print
impressions that they were supposed to identify and correctly noted
the two elimination latent prints that they were not supposed to
identify.225 In total, scientists counted forty-eight false matches.226
The combined results of these proficiency tests show that fingerprint
examiners get erroneous results in an average of 0.8% of cases227—a
significant error rate.
Of course, errors in fingerprint analysis also occur in actual cases
before the courts. Simon Cole reviewed twenty-two documented
cases in the United States, England, and Scotland in which people
were arrested and, at times, even served prison sentences before the
error was detected.228 Considering the Hidden Accidents Principle in
criminal law, this is likely only the tip of the iceberg of errors in

[https://perma.cc/FUN2-7D4U]; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 65.
222. I.W. Evett & R.L. Williams, A Review of the Sixteen Points Fingerprint Standard in England
and Wales, 46 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 49, 49 (1996); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 65.
223. Evett & Williams, supra note 222, at 72; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 65; see also
Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1221–22.
224. David L. Grieve, Possession of Truth, 46 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 521, 523 (1996); Sangero
& Halpert, supra note 59, at 65.
225. Grieve, supra note 224, at 524.
226. Id.
227. LYN HABER & RALPH N. HABER, Error Rates for Human Fingerprint Examiners, in AUTOMATIC
FINGERPRINT RECOGNITION SYSTEMS 339, 349 (Nalini K. Ratha et al. eds., 2003); Cole, supra note 42,
at 1034, 1073; see Joseph L. Peterson & Penelope N. Markham, Crime Laboratory Proficiency Testing
Results, 1978–1991, II: Resolving Questions of Common Origin, 40 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1009 (1995);
Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 65.
228. Cole, supra note 42, at 1001–16; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 65–66.
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fingerprint analysis, but most errors have not been detected and the
falsely convicted inmates remain in prison.
A number of issues may cause frequent laboratory errors in
fingerprint analysis, including: poor quality of fingerprints taken
from the crime scene (as opposed to the good quality of prints calmly
scanned by access control systems),229 automated fingerprint
identification systems,230 substandard or unscientific practices among
certain “experts,”231 and pressure exerted on laboratory staff by the
police and/or prosecution to find a match.232 In addition, latent
images are often distorted, smaller in surface area than the full print,
and frequently contain artifacts resulting from the processes
necessary to make latent prints visible. As a result, two impressions
from two different sources could be mistaken as coming from the
same source.233
Leading forensic science researchers have called for the
abandonment of “absolute conclusions” and, instead urge for the
recognition of the inherently probabilistic nature of fingerprint
evidence.234 The key question is not the uniqueness of friction ridge
skin, but rather the fingerprint examiner’s ability to derive sufficient
information from very limited sources. The researchers have
suggested replacing experience and tradition alone with transparent
and empirically-based practice.235 Yet, as Mnookin describes the
current situation,
ACE-V’s relationship to the scientific method is tenuous at

229. See Pankanti et al., supra note 217, at 1016; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 66.
230. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., OVERSIGHT & REVIEW DIV., A
REVIEW OF THE FBI’S HANDLING OF THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE 1 (2006),
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0601/exec.pdf [https://perma.cc/6M2S-GW8V] (unclassified and
redacted).
231. Saks & Koehler, Forensic Identification Science, supra note 35, at 893.
232. Id.; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 66.
233. Jennifer L. Mnookin et al., The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences, 58 UCLA
L. REV. 725, 751 (2011).
234. Christopher Champod & Ian W. Evett, A Probabilistic Approach to Fingerprint Evidence, 51 J.
FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 101, 110 (2001).
235. Id.; see also Mnookin et al., supra note 233, at 751.
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best . . . [L]atent fingerprint examination as a field lacks
any formalized specifications about what is required in
order to declare a match. There is no required minimum
number of points of resemblance or minimum number of
total print features, nor any required quantum of any
specific kind of ridge detail . . . Two fingerprint analysts
will often focus on different minutiae in their examination
of the same print . . . The judgment is fundamentally a
subjective one, not based on any formalized measures of
either quantity or sufficiency. Additionally, latent
fingerprints examiners do not generally employ any
statistical information or models in the ordinary ACE-V
process . . . [T]here simply is no well-accepted, fullyspecified statistical model that is available for latent
fingerprint examiners to employ . . . [F]undamentally,
fingerprint matching ought to be thought of as a
probabilistic inquiry.236
2. The Brandon Mayfield Case and the U.S. Department of
Justice’s Report
Following the 2004 terror attacks in Madrid, which led to 191
deaths and 2,050 nonfatal injuries, the Spanish police found a
fingerprint on a blue plastic bag near one of the attack sites; it
contained detonators and explosives remnants.237 The Spanish police
requested assistance from the FBI,238 which searched its fingerprint
database using an Automated Fingerprint Identification System
(AFIS). The search printout identified twenty potential suspects.239 In
analyzing the samples from the possible suspects, a fingerprint
examiner found a match between the print taken from the attack site
and that of a Portland, Oregon, attorney named Brandon Mayfield.240
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1219–22.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 230, at 1; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 66–67.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 230, at 1.
Id.
Id.
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Mayfield told FBI interrogators that he had never been to Spain in his
life, had been in the United States at the time of the attacks, and did
not even have a passport.241 Nonetheless, three senior FBI examiners
verified the identification of Mayfield’s fingerprints,242 and the
affidavit supporting an arrest warrant for Mayfield in the United
States declared a 100% positive identification.243 While Mayfield
was in detention, the court appointed an independent fingerprint
examiner to verify the identification made by FBI examiners.244 Two
weeks after Mayfield’s arrest, the Spanish police located someone
else, an Algerian named Ouhnane Daoud, whose fingerprints
matched the prints found on the plastic bag at the scene of the
attacks.245 Thus, the 100% “certain” identification of Mayfield’s
fingerprints by four different examiners was wrong. Mayfield was
released246 and subsequently received $2 million in compensation.247
In 2006, the U.S. Justice Department released a comprehensive
report on the Mayfield case.248 The report stated that the main cause
of the false identification was the very strong similarity between
Mayfield’s fingerprint and the print from the attack site, which,
according to Spanish police, belonged to Ouhnane Daoud.249 The
report explained that it is possible for a great similarity between
fingerprints to arise in an AFIS search, as the system scans millions
of prints and compares each to the prints found at the scene of the
crime.250 The system produces a list of twenty candidates who it has
found to have the most similar fingerprints to the crime scene
241. Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1228.
242. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 230, at 1–2.
243. See id. at 18–19.
244. Id. at 3; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 66–67.
245. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 230, at 3.
246. Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1228–30; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 66–67; Robert B.
Stacey, Report on Erroneous Fingerprint Individualization in the Madrid Train Bombing Case, 54 J.
FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 706, 706 (2004); William C. Thompson & Simon A. Cole, Lessons from the
Brandon Mayfield Case, 29 CHAMPION 42, 42 (2005); Steven T. Wax & Christopher J. Schatz, A
Multitude of Errors: The Brandon Mayfield Case, 28 CHAMPION 6, 10 (2004).
247. Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1229.
248. U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, supra note 230, at 1.
249. Id. at 3, 6.
250. Id. at 1.
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fingerprints.251 Consequently, the fingerprint examiners had to
analyze fingerprints that were very similar to those of Daoud. The
report cautioned that the risk of error with “cold hit” database
searches is far greater than when suspects are identified by way of a
regular police investigation,252 and the constantly growing size of the
databases increases the risk of misidentification.253
Peer pressure and “expectation bias” also played a role in the
misidentification; once the first expert has declared a match between
prints, the verifying experts naturally expect to find the same
match.254 And indeed, the Justice Department report determined that
the second verifying examiner knew that the first examiner had found
a match between Mayfield’s print and the fingerprints from the scene
of the crime.255 Thus, the report recommended withholding such
information from verifying examiners.256
Another factor in the match found in the misidentification of
Mayfield’s prints is cognitive bias. Mayfield had converted to Islam
sometime earlier, his wife was Egyptian, and he had once represented
a known terrorist in a child custody dispute.257 The report determined
that this background information did not influence the initial
identification of a match, as it was unknown to police investigators at
the time, but it did impact the verification stage when examiners had
this data.258 Forensic examiners often have access to or are provided
with external information about the case that is irrelevant to the
analysis,259 and research has shown that this impacts the analysis.
Itiel E. Dror et al. used the Mayfield case to prove “contextual bias”
in these circumstances. Five experts were each given a different pair
of latent prints and potential source prints and told that they were the

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Id.
Id. at 7.
Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1229.
Id. at 1230.
U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, supra note 230, 10–11.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 11–12.
Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1230.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol34/iss4/8

50

Sangero: Safety from Flawed Forensic Sciences Evidence

2018]

FLAWED FORENSIC SCIENCES EVIDENCE

1179

prints from the well-known Mayfield case, when in fact each expert
received a pair of prints that the same expert had previously
analyzed, identified, and testified to in court as a 100% match.260 In
the Dror et al. experiment, three of the experts arrived at the opposite
conclusion of no match, likely due to bias; one expert found the
prints “inconclusive”; and only one was consistent and again
identified a match between the prints.261 Other experiments
conducted by Dror et al. with different experts also found bias.262
Although the medical diagnostics and other scientific fields make
formalized efforts to shield researchers from “contextual
information,” no such procedures generally exist in the forensic
sciences field.263 Thus, to prevent some of the biases, I suggest giving
fingerprint examiners not just the suspect’s print to compare against
the latent print from the crime scene, but also several “filler” prints
from other people as well. This will prevent the examiner from
knowing at the outset which print belongs to the suspect.264
As we then see, errors in fingerprint analysis can and do (as in the
Mayfield case) actually occur in reality and are not a mere theoretical
probability. Moreover, given the Hidden Accidents Principle, there
are likely many more cases in which these errors remain
undetected.265 Compounding this problem is the fact that some
fingerprints are so similar to one another that examiners are incapable
of distinguishing between them. Thus, the general error rate in
fingerprint analysis is unknown.266 Although the general error rate is
260. Itiel E. Dror, David Charlton & Ailsa E. Péron, Contextual Information Renders Experts
Vulnerable to Making Erroneous Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 74, 75 (2006).
261. Id. at 76; see also Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1232.
262. Itiel E. Dror & D. Charlton, Why Experts Make Errors, 56 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 600, 600
(2006); Itiel E. Dror & Robert Rosenthal, Meta-analytically Quantifying the Reliability and Biasability
of Forensic Experts, 53 J. FORENSIC SCI. 900, 903 (2008); see also Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1232.
263. Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1230–31.
264. See Gary L. Wells et al., Forensic Science Testing: The Forensic Filler-Control Method for
Controlling Contextual Bias, Estimating Error Rates, and Calibrating Analysts’ Reports, 2 J. APPLIED
RES. MEMORY & COGNITION 53, 53 (2013) (offering a similar recommendation); see also William C.
Thompson, What Role Should Investigative Facts Play in the Evaluation of Scientific Evidence, 43
AUSTRALIAN J. FORENSIC SCI. 123, 123 (2011).
265. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 68.
266. Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1227–28; Mnookin, supra note 214, at 59.
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commonly estimated to be low, proficiency tests given to examiners
belie this estimate. Above in Section II.C we have seen the
tremendous significance of even a very low error rate.
3. Case Law
Fingerprint analysis evidence is generally sufficient as the sole
basis for a conviction in American courts.267 Over the last decade and
a half, courts have begun to indicate skepticism with regard to this
type of evidence,268 with some explicitly holding errors to be possible
in fingerprint comparisons.269 However, the problematic report
referred to by the FBI as the “50K Study” gave undeserving support
to fingerprint evidence.270 Although the findings of this so-called
study were never published in a scientific journal or subject to peer
review (as the Daubert standard requires),271 judges have nonetheless
relied on these findings in their rulings.272
The “study” was in fact conducted to find support for the claim
relied on by prosecutors that every fingerprint is unique and that false
positive errors are not possible in fingerprint comparisons.273 FBI
examiners used an AFIS search with a computerized database of
50,000 fingerprints to compare each fingerprint against itself and
against the 49,999 other fingerprints in the database.274 This process

267. See, e.g., People v. Rhodes, 422 N.E.2d 605, 608 (Ill. 1981); People v. Ford, 606 N.E.2d 690,
693 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); see also Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 69.
268. See United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 565 (E.D. Pa. 2002); see also Epstein,
supra note 213, at 269; Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility Rulings
from Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1189, 1196–97 (2004); David H.
Kaye, The Nonscience of Fingerprinting: United States v. Llera-Plaza, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1073,
1074 (2003); Michael Lynch & Simon A. Cole, Science and Technology Studies on Trial: Dilemmas of
Expertise, 35 SOC. STUD. SCI. 269, 270 (2005); Mnookin, supra note 22, at 48; Sangero & Halpert,
supra note 59, at 69.
269. United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 273–74 (4th Cir. 2003) (Michael, J., dissenting); State v.
Quintana, 103 P.3d 168, 171 (Utah Ct. App. 2004); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 68.
270. Epstein, supra note 213, at 629–32; Cole, supra note 42, at 1046–48, 1047 n.334.
271. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
272. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 239–41 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v.
Sanchez-Birruetta, 128 Fed. Appx. 571, 573 (9th Cir. 2005).
273. Sanchez-Birruetta, 128 Fed. Appx. at 573; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 70–71.
274. Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 225; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 70.
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yielded 2.5 billion comparisons (50,000 × 50,000),275 which some
courts considered as evidence that false positives cannot occur in
fingerprint comparison.276
The main methodological flaw in the FBI “study” was the
comparison of the fingerprint images against themselves.277 For the
study to have been scientifically valid, the 50,000 images should
have been compared with 50,000 other images of the same
fingerprints, i.e. there should have been two different images of each
fingerprint. When 50,000 images are compared against themselves,
there is of course no possibility of error. The image is stored on the
computer as a digital file, which is a collection of digits. When two
images are identical, the digits that represent them will also be
identical. Two different digital images, however, even of the same
fingerprint, will be represented in the computer’s memory by
different digits, and in this case, an error is possible. If we take what
occurs in the reality of a forensic fingerprint comparison, two
different images are in fact compared: the one from the crime scene
and the image of the suspect’s fingerprint. Given this grave analytical
mistake, this “study” has unsurprisingly drawn harsh criticism from
experts in the field.278
Mnookin has described three approaches in American case law to
fingerprint evidence.279 The first is to simply ignore the problem:
courts hold that fingerprint evidence easily passes the Daubert test
and disregard all the above-mentioned difficulties with this
evidence—the lack of scientific testing, the lack of a meaningful
error rate, and the lack of a statistical foundation or validated,
objective criteria for determining a match.280 The second approach

275. Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 225. In a second experiment, they compared partial prints. Id. at 226.
276. Sanchez-Birruetta, 128 Fed. Appx. at 571, 573.
277. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 70.
278. Champod & Evett, supra note 234, at 112; David H. Kaye, Questioning a Courtroom Proof of
the Uniqueness of Fingerprints, 71 INT’L STAT. REV. 521, 521 (2003); Pankanti et al., supra note 217, at
1015; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 70.
279. Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1241–65.
280. Id. at 1243–47. The example is the verdict in United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 855
(S.D. Ind. 2000).
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seemingly applies the Daubert test to the fingerprint evidence but too
easily concludes its admissibility: “these courts, though squirming a
bit and acknowledging some of the legitimate concerns regarding the
research basis for this evidence, find that, on balance, the evidence
still warrants admission in its traditional form, though without fully
explaining what justifies this conclusion.”281 The third approach
courts take is to allow the fingerprints expert to testify on the
similarities and differences in the patterns at issue, while prohibiting
or limiting her from presenting conclusions regarding the meaning of
the similarities.282
Based on the 2009 NAS Report, discussed in detail below,
Mnookin offers another approach, namely “Exclusion (for Now)”:283
[A]t present, pattern identification evidence does not have
the empirical data to back up the claims made in court.
Moreover, just as with DNA evidence—which, after an
initial honeymoon period, was excluded by a number of
jurisdictions for a short period of time because of concerns
about the subjectivity of standards for determining a match;
insufficient research into the underlying questions of
population genetics; and general technical sloppiness—
exclusion would be a great motivator for pursuing the
research necessary to justify admissibility . . .
. . . Good proficiency tests, which show the extent to
which examiners make errors in a variety of different levels
of difficulty, should suffice to support a finding of adequate
validity, presuming that the error rates discovered through
this testing process are tolerably low, and the match
between what was tested and the “task at hand” in the
281. Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1248–52. The example is the verdict in United States v. Sullivan, 246
F. Supp. 2d 700, 702–04 (E.D. Ky. 2003).
282. Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1252–64. An example is the verdict in United States v. Llera Plaza,
179 F. Supp. 2d 492, 516 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
283. Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1265.
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particular case is sufficiently close . . .
. . . [T]he courts should care less about the details of the
method . . . and more about what evidence there is to
support the conclusion that the methods actually work . . .
...
. . . [H]ow accurate are examiners when matching latent
prints to a particular source; latent prints which are often
partial, frequently smudged, and perhaps even distorted?284
Mnookin estimates that if judges require that experts provide the
error rate of their work as a prerequisite for the admissibility of
fingerprint evidence, research will be conducted and very important
knowledge produced.285 Experts should not be able to simply claim
an error rate of zero and they must give up the claim that they are
able to individualize.286 I find this view convincing and an important
step on the way to safety in fingerprint evidence. In fact, in a
promising decision from 2007, a court excluded fingerprint evidence,
describing it as “a subjective, untested, unverifiable identification
procedure that purports to be infallible.”287
4. The 2009 NAS Report
As opposed to the “50K study,” the most informative document on
the accuracy of fingerprint comparison is the 2009 NAS Report on
forensic science in the United States.288 The report deals with
fingerprints under the category of “friction ridge analysis”: palm

284. Id. at 1265–67.
285. Id. at 1243.
286. Id. at 1275.
287. Maryland v. Rose, No. K06-0545, slip op. at 31 (Balt. Cty. Cir. Ct. Oct. 19, 2007). The decision
was overturned by a federal judge in United States v. Rose, 672 F. Supp. 2d 723, 726 (D. Md. 2009).
288. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 2–3.
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prints and sole prints.289 The report found that the “training of
personnel to perform latent print identifications varies from agency to
agency” and can amount to only a one-week-long course.290 “Not all
agencies require [that their staff] acquire and maintain
certification.”291 As mentioned above, the technique used to examine
prints is Analysis-Comparison-Evaluation-Verification (ACE-V).292
In the analysis stage, the examiner considers the following features:
condition of the skin, type of residue, mechanics of touch, nature of
the surface touched, development technique, capture technique, and
size of the latent print.293 In the next stage, a visual comparison is
made between the latent print and the known print derived from the
suspect.294 The examiner then performs source determination by
evaluating whether there is identification.295 Last, there is verification
of the first examiner’s findings by another qualified examiner, who
repeats the observations and comes to a conclusion, although he or
she may be aware of the conclusion arrived at by the first
examiner.296 The NAS Report describes the process and its
problematic subjective aspects as follows:
Note that the ACE-V method does not specify particular
measurements or a standard test protocol, and examiners
must make subjective assessments throughout. In the
United States, the threshold for making a source
identification is deliberately kept subjective, so that the
examiner can take into account both the quantity and
quality of comparable details. As a result, the outcome of a
friction ridge analysis is not necessarily repeatable from
examiner to examiner. In fact, recent research by Dror has
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

Id. at 136–55.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 137.
Id.
Id. at 137–38.
NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 138.
Id.
Id.
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shown that experienced examiners do not necessarily agree
with even their own past conclusions when the examination
is presented in a different context some time later.297
It is important to stress again in this context that the experts usually
work with the police and have knowledge of details of the
investigation, such as the fact that the suspect was identified by the
victim. This extraneous knowledge is likely to influence the expert’s
subjective evaluations as to a match between the prints. The report
notes further on this issue:
This subjectivity is intrinsic to friction ridge analysis, as
can be seen when comparing it with DNA analysis . . .
. . . By contrast, before examining two fingerprints, one
cannot say a priori which features should be
compared . . . For these reasons, population statistics for
fingerprints have not been developed, and friction ridge
analysis relies on subjective judgments by the examiner.
Little research has been directed toward developing
population statistics, although more would be feasible.298
A safety approach, however, would lead to this much-needed
research, which should lead in turn to the design and implementation
of objective standards.
On the matter of “methods of interpretation,” the report found that:
The clarity of the prints being compared is a major
underlying factor . . . Clearly, the reliability of the ACE-V
process could be improved if specific measurement criteria
were defined. Those criteria become increasingly important
when working with latent prints that are smudged and
297. Id. at 139. The report refers to Dror & Charlton, supra note 262, at 600–16.
298. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 139–40.
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incomplete, or when comparing impressions from two
individuals whose prints are unusually similar.299
The report also referred to the reporting of results: “the friction ridge
community actively discourages its members from testifying in terms
of the probability of a match.”300
The report concurred301 with Mnookin’s observations, which she
stated as follows:
Experts therefore make only what they term “positive” or
“absolute” identifications—essentially making the claim
that they have matched the latent print to the one and only
person in the entire world whose fingerprint could have
produced it . . . [S]uch claims . . . are unjustified . . .
Therefore, in order to pass scrutiny under Daubert,
fingerprint identification experts should exhibit a greater
degree of epistemological humility. Claims of “absolute”
and “positive” identification should be replaced by more
modest claims about the meaning and significance of a
“match.”302
In its “summary assessment,” the report referred to Lyn Haber and
Ralph Norman Haber’s work,303 where they showed that there is no
scientific evidence of the validity of the ACE-V method.304
Examiners differ at each stage of the method in their conclusions, and
no single protocol has been officially accepted by the profession;
therefore, the validity of the ACE-V method cannot be tested. The
report also noted that two legal decisions have highlighted the crucial
299. Id. at 140.
300. Id. at 141.
301. Id. at 142.
302. Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification: Confessions of a
Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 127, 139 (2008).
303. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 133.
304. L. Haber & R.N. Haber, Scientific Validation of Fingerprints Evidence Under Daubert, 7 L.
PROBABILITY & RISK 87, 87 (2008).
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issues of the lack of documentation and lack of data as to the error
rate.305 Another justified “criticism of the latent print community is
that examiners can too easily explain a ‘difference’ as an ‘acceptable
distortion’ in order to make an identification.”306
Finally, the report made a very important recommendation: the
establishment of an independent federal agency to regulate,
supervise, and improve forensic sciences, to be known as the
National Institute for Forensic Science (NIFS).307
5. The 2012 Expert Working Group Report
Perhaps the most significant development in this field of late is the
2012 National Institute of Standards and Technology report, entitled
Latent Print Examination and Human Factors: Improving the
Practice through a Systems Approach—The Report of the Expert
Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis.308 The
report’s most noteworthy recommendation, consistent with the
recommendations in the 2009 NAS Report, is as follows: “Because
empirical evidence and statistical reasoning do not support a source
attribution to the exclusion of all other individuals in the world, latent
print examiners should not report or testify, directly or by
implication, to a source attribution to the exclusion of all others in the
world.”309 Another important recommendation relates to the
problematic and flawed use of AFIS searches, as illustrated by the
Brandon Mayfield case:
When comparing latent prints to exemplars generated
through AFIS searches, examiners must recognize the
305. New Hampshire v. Langill, 945 A.2d 1, 11–12 (N.H. 2008); Maryland v. Rose, No. K06-0545,
slip op. at 25–26 (Balt. Cty. Cir. Ct. Oct. 19, 2007).
306. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 145.
307. Id. at 189.
308. See generally NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., LATENT PRINT EXAMINATION AND HUMAN
FACTORS: IMPROVING THE PRACTICE THROUGH A SYSTEMS APPROACH—THE REPORT OF THE EXPERT
WORKING GROUP ON HUMAN FACTORS IN LATENT PRINT ANALYSIS (2012),
http://www.nist.gov/oles/upload/latent.pdf [http://perma.cc/G299-SJBP].
309. Id. at 197.
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possibility and dangers of incidental similarity.
Adjustments such as a higher decision threshold, stricter
tolerances for differences in appearance, and explicit
feature weighting need to be considered. Modified quality
assurance practices for this scenario also should be
considered.310
Other important recommendations in the report relate to reporting,
documentation, and testimony, including the adoption of codes of
ethics.311 There is also a set of recommendations that stem from a
safety approach, as proposed in this article. As explained in the
report:
Supervision of the staff members and management of the
facilities are essential to risk reduction and quality
assurance and control. Effective management requires good
information about the incidence and sources of errors.
Making the information available requires a culture in
which both management and staff understand that openness
about errors is not necessarily a path to punitive
sanctions.312
Also in line with the safety approach I advocate adopting are the
report’s recommendations to improve staff training and education,313
to provide proper facilities and equipment,314 and to channel federal
support to research efforts.315
6. The 2016 Report to the President
The report found that:
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

Id. at 199.
Id. at 200–01.
Id. at 201.
Id. at 202–03.
NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH, supra note 308, at 203.
Id. at 203–06.
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[L]atent fingerprint analysis is a foundationally valid
subjective methodology—albeit with a false positive rate
that is substantial and is likely to be higher than expected
by many jurors based on longstanding claims about the
infallibility of fingerprint analysis. The false-positive rate
could be as high as 1 error in 306 cases based on the FBI
study and 1 error in 18 cases based on a study by another
crime laboratory. In reporting results of latent-fingerprint
examination, it is important to state the false-positive rates
based on properly designed validation studies.316
The report refers to confirmation bias, contextual bias, and
proficiency testing and recommends continuing efforts to improve
the state of latent-print analysis.317
Finally,
[a] second—and more important—direction is to convert
latent-print analysis from a subjective method to an
objective method. The past decade has seen extraordinary
advances in automated image analysis based on machine
learning and other approaches—leading to dramatic
improvements in such tasks as face recognition and the
interpretation of medical images. This progress holds
promise of making fully automated latent fingerprint
analysis possible in the near future. There have already
been initial steps in this direction, both in academia and
industry.318

316. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 130, at 9–10.
317. Id. at 10.
318. Id. at 10–11.
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7. Summary and Recommendations
It is important to stress that I do not advocate generally ruling out
the admissibility of fingerprint evidence.319 Such a sweeping move,
in my view,320 would be decidedly misguided. This is indisputably
significant and weighty evidence321 that the courts should be allowed
to continue to rely on. What is necessary, however, is that this type of
evidence be improved and upgraded, and that it not be allowed to
constitute the sole basis of a conviction.
In the current state of affairs, as described, there is essentially a
lack of scientific grounding for fingerprint comparisons, because the
possibility of a random match has never been refuted. More
significantly, courts are not presented with testifying experts’ error
rates. It is therefore almost shocking that this evidence plays such a
main role in criminal trials and convictions. Even if the Random
Mach Probability were proven to be very low (or even zero) and the
error rate proven to be very low (but non-zero), a conviction beyond
a reasonable doubt would still be impossible to establish based solely
on this evidence.322 Moreover, under the modern safety approach
proposed in this article, it is necessary to strive to gather and present
the most accurate evidence possible in a criminal investigation. Thus,
there should be a rule requiring that examiners work for an
independent federal agency rather than under the authority of the law
enforcement agencies. As I will explain below, forensic science
evidence—including fingerprint comparisons—should not be
admissible in court unless the evidence has been developed as a
319. I have stressed this point elsewhere, along with Dr. Halpert, for example in Sangero & Halpert,
supra note 59, at 71.
320. See Epstein, supra note 213, at 624–25, 627 (discussing claims that fingerprint evidence does not
meet the criteria of the Daubert ruling).
321. Computerized models have been developed in the field of pattern recognition for the
computerized comparison of fingerprints. See Joaquin Gonzalez-Rodriguez et al., Bayesian Analysis of
Fingerprint, Face and Signature Evidences with Automatic Biometric Systems, 155 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L
126, 132–34 (2005). These models provide data on the error rate in various categories of test conditions
for different systems. Id. at 133–34. Thus, computerized fingerprint evidence has an identification
capability and enables the determination of an identification error rate. See Sangero & Halpert, supra
note 59, at 71. There is still much to be done in this field, however.
322. See supra Part II.C (demonstrating the significance of even a low error rate).
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safety-critical system. A substantial leap in this direction would be to
adopt the recommendations made in the 2009 NAS Report, the 2012
Expert Working Group report, and the 2016 Report to the President,
which conducted research to establish probabilities rather than
absolute results, research on error rates, and development and
implementation of appropriate protocols for fingerprint
comparisons.323
Finally, we should also recall the possibility that a wrongdoer or
police officer may transfer an innocent person’s fingerprints to a
crime scene to frame the innocent person. This possibility contributes
to the lack of safety regarding fingerprint evidence.324
F. “Junk Science” As Evidence
During the early modern period of history from 1450 to 1750, the
infamous “Satanic witch trials” were conducted in England, in which
women were accused of witchcraft and devil worship.325 To prove
the guilt of the accused, so-called experts were called upon, who
searched—and often found—the “Devil’s mark” on the women’s
bodies.326 In particular, they searched for the remains of what was
known as the “witches’ teat” by which the women purportedly
nourished the Devil.327 These experts developed special methods for
examining the women’s bodies for these marks.328 The English courts
admitted their testimony as evidence proving guilt.329 Moreover, even
when the Devil’s mark could not be found on a woman’s body, this
323. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 31–32 (“Recommendation 12: Congress should authorize and
appropriate funds for the National Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS) to launch a new broad-based
effort to achieve nationwide fingerprint data interoperability. To that end, NIFS should convene a task
force comprising relevant experts from the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the
major law enforcement agencies . . . and industry, as appropriate.”).
324. For a discussion of such a case in Israel of transferring a fingerprint of the suspect to the crime
scene by a police officer, see SANGERO, supra note 8, at 190–91.
325. ORNA ALYAGON DARR, MARKS OF AN ABSOLUTE WITCH: EVIDENTIARY DILEMMAS IN EARLY
MODERN ENGLAND 6–8 (2011).
326. Id. at 114.
327. Id. at 114–15.
328. Id. at 119.
329. Id. at 61.

Published by Reading Room, 2018

63

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 8

1192

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:4

was not regarded as a sign of innocence.330 The convicted women
were sentenced to death.331 The question that arises is: How far have
we advanced since then? To this very day, courts unfortunately
continue to admit certain types of evidence that are deserving of the
title “junk science”332—such as microscopical hair comparisons,
shoeprint comparisons, and voiceprint identification—as evidence.333
The 2009 NAS Report reviewed in detail the various areas of
microscopical comparison and comparisons based on an expert’s
subjective impression, and determined that, with the sole exception
of DNA comparisons, 334 none of these fields is currently grounded in
science.335
The law is not a science—certainly not an exact one. In the law,
crucial decisions are made in conditions of uncertainty. In scientific
research, there is no need to reach a conclusion at a particular given
moment and the research can be continued until it reaches an
advanced stage in which precise conclusions can be made. In a trial,
there is a need to arrive at a determination within a reasonable period
of time, and it is not possible to wait interminably for more data and
information. Science is considered precise, and therefore, it is no

330. Id. at 118.
331. DARR, supra note 325, at 73; SANGERO, supra note 8, at 125.
332. Even though the expression “junk science” was already in use in the 1980s, it only achieved
wider recognition in the legal world following the release of the book PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S
REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 2 (1991), and the similarly entitled article, Peter W.
Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 723, 723 (1992). At a certain point, the term
came to be used also to describe forensic science that leads to many false convictions. See, e.g., David
Bernstein, Junk Science in the United States and the Commonwealth, 21 YALE J. INT’L L. 123, 124
(1996); Paul C. Giannelli, Junk Science: The Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 105, 105
(1993); Thomas R. May, Fire Pattern Analysis, Junk Science, Old Wives Tales, and Ipse Dixit:
Emerging Forensic 3D Imaging Technologies to the Rescue?, 16 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 13, 13 (2010);
Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 427.
333. BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 158–71 (2000); Erica Beecher-Monas, Blinded by
Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in Scientific Evidence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 56 (1998); Garrett
& Neufeld, supra note 38, at 71–75; Saks & Koehler, Forensic Identification Science, supra note 35, at
892–93; GARRETT, supra note 7, at 95–100, 105–06.
334. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 7 (“With the exception of nuclear DNA analysis, however,
no forensic method has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high
degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and a specific individual or source.”).
335. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 161; SANGERO, supra note 8, at 127.
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wonder that legal practitioners tend to pursue it. When police
investigators, prosecutors, and judges base a defendant’s guilt on
scientific evidence they feel more secure and convinced. When a
piece of evidence is truly scientific—that is, well grounded in valid
and reliable scientific research—their reliance on this evidence
should be commended, so long as they are not blinded into putting
everything else aside and according this evidence more weight than it
warrants. Even the strongest scientific evidence today—DNA genetic
comparisons and fingerprint comparisons—are not sufficiently strong
to serve as the sole basis for proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
This deficiency stems somewhat from the possibility of a random
match, but has more to do with the far-more-probable likelihood of a
lab error or error in an expert’s analysis.336
This section is devoted to those types of evidence that are
deceptively presented as “scientific” when they in fact lack a
sufficient scientific basis, and moreover, when courts sometimes
refer to them in their decisions as “scientific.” Junk science disguised
as true science is likely to mislead judges and jurors into thinking it is
actually scientific evidence and thus result in false convictions.337 In
this section, I will consider additional factors that contribute to
courts’ misguided admission of junk science as evidence: namely, the
“Sherlock Holmes myth” and “CSI effect,” and the misleading or
erroneous presentation of evidence by police and prosecution experts.
Mention of an additional issue—beyond the existence of junk
science—affecting the forensic sciences field, such as DNA
comparisons, is necessary here. Namely, an uneven balance of power
exists between the prosecution and defense such that almost all the
scientific evidence submitted in court is presented by the
prosecution.338 Even on the few occasions on which the defense
336. SANGERO, supra note 8, at 128; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 61.
337. SANGERO, supra note 8, at 129.
338. An empirical study conducted in the United States found that court-appointed defense attorneys
hire experts in only 2% of their criminal cases and in only 17% of their manslaughter cases. See Keith
A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS.
L. REV. 291, 333 (2006) (citing Michael McConville & Chestler L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the
Poor in New York City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 581, 764 (1986–1987)); see also Sangero &
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counsel submits expert testimony, judges tend to prefer the testimony
of the prosecution’s expert witnesses.339
Crime laboratories, which engage in what is called “forensic
science” and produce scientific evidence, are usually not
autonomous, but rather operate under the direct authority of the
police and prosecution.340 The laboratory personnel work closely and
routinely with the police investigators and also with prosecutors at
times, making it hard to expect them to be completely objective in
performing their jobs.341 It is reasonable to assume that police
investigators bring pressure to bear on lab staff to find evidence that
supports the suspect’s guilt. In addition, the police investigators feed
the lab workers details of the investigation that are completely
irrelevant to the tests they perform, but that reinforce the perception
of the suspect’s guilt, such as the fact that the suspect confessed or
was identified by the victim.342 Here too, the misconception of the
suspect’s guilt (“Tunnel Vision”) plays a vital role: many in the law
enforcement system tend to assume that the suspect is guilty and that
they need simply find evidence that proves this guilt.343 At times, the
lab workers are requested, by definition, to conduct only the tests that
are likely to incriminate the suspect, without performing any other
tests that could prove his innocence or even incriminate someone
else.344 At a later stage, the testimony of the expert is also likely to be
misleading. Thus, for example, experts tend to testify to a
significantly higher level of precision in the test that they performed
than the real degree of precision according to the most up-to-date
scientific research.345

Halpert, supra note 11, at 434.
339. Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 38, at 90–91.
340. Id. at 33–34; DiFonzo, supra note 25, at 4–5.
341. Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 38, at 33–34.
342. Thompson, supra note 30, at 1034.
343. Findley & Scott, supra note 338, at 292 (“[F]ocus on a suspect, select and filter the evidence that
will ‘build a case’ for conviction, while ignoring or suppressing evidence that points away from guilt.”).
344. Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 38, at 81–83.
345. See id. at 84.
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Many judges are unaware of the possibility—which always
exists—of a lab testing error and do not question the experts on this;
the experts, for their part, often do not bother to volunteer such
information. Moreover, with regard to the majority of the branches of
“forensic science,” even if the experts wanted to provide the court
with information about the precision of the tests and their estimated
error rate, they would not be able to do so due to the lack of existing
research and data.346
In addition, the majority of the “forensic sciences” branches—
particularly those in which experts testify on the comparisons they
perform between marks at the crime scene and marks made by an
object or limb belonging to the defendant—have been developed
especially for the purpose of solving crimes; they were not developed
by scientists.347 These branches are not, therefore, based on
methodical scientific research with an adequate database, but rather
on experience gathered by “experts” through their use of the very
system developed to solve crimes.348
It has been suggested that a distinction be drawn between scientists
and technicians.349 To guarantee objectivity, scientists use “blind
tests” to determine whether a particular result is correct or the
product of contamination. In contrast, technicians usually know how
but not why. Many forensic fields fall into the sphere of technicians’
work and not scientific work. Technicians, even when they are doing
their job properly, lack the necessary scientific training to plan
experiments that will turn their work into science. In addition, they
lack the necessary databases for conducting statistical calculations. In
fact, many forensic areas were developed by law enforcement agents,
who, in their attempts to solve crimes and, often, to find
incriminating evidence against the suspect, tended to turn unfounded

346. SANGERO, supra note 8, at 106.
347. Id.
348. Id.
at
107;
see
generally
INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
www.innocenceproject.org
[https://perma.cc/L9W8-TVS2] (last visited July 7, 2018).
349. Craig M. Cooley, Forensic Science or Forgettable Science?, 80 IND. L.J. 80, 81 (2005);
SANGERO, supra note 8, at 107.
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premises of the individualization of certain crime scene marks into
so-called science. Allegedly, if a mark found at the crime scene
resembles the mark left by an object or limb belonging to the
defendant, this necessitates the conclusion that the defendant’s object
or limb left the mark found at the crime scene. This is the case with
regard to microscopical comparisons of hair, fibers, tool marks,
weapon marks, shoeprints, teeth prints, and even ear prints.350 The
possibilities are limitless.
At the suggestion of Michael Risinger, we should also include the
great detective Sherlock Holmes on the list of those responsible for
this current state of shoddiness.351 What do we all love about
Sherlock Holmes? Among other things, he has contributed to the
great faith we all have in the brain’s ability to perpetually and
precisely deduce the criminal’s identity based on how the criminal
acted from the evidence found at the crime scene. Not only the public
at large but also forensic practitioners have apparently been raised on
the Sherlock Holmes myth. Similarly, many wrongly think that the
work of forensic labs is as perfect as it appears on the popular CSI
television series, whose influence on jurors and other entities in the
criminal justice system has been significant and harmful.352
Studies have uncovered the development of a nonscientific
subculture in laboratories, developed out of an eagerness to please
police investigators. This subculture seeks to “deliver the goods” to
convince the court rather than adhere to science, even if the results
are equivocal and are likely to disappoint those who believe that the
suspect committed the crime.353 This was the case in the infamous
Houston crime lab scandal: the lab was closed down after it emerged
350. BEATRICE SCHIFFER & CHRISTOPHE CHAMPOD, Judicial Error and Forensic Science: Pondering
the Contribution of DNA Evidence, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON
MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 33, 38 (C. Ronald Huff & Martin Killias eds., 2008); SANGERO, supra note
8, at 107.
351. Risinger, supra note 27, at 527; SANGERO, supra note 8, at 108.
352. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 48; Bolden, supra note 11, at 425; Difonzo, supra note 25, at
2–3 (noting the “‘CSI Effect,’ popularly defined as ‘the perception of the near-infallibility of forensic
science in response to the TV show’”); Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1209.
353. Saks & Koehler, Forensic Identification Science, supra note 35, at 893; SANGERO, supra note 8,
at 108.
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that for many years, it had been systematically providing erroneous
lab results, which had served as the basis for many convictions.354
The exposure of the scandal in 2002 on a television program left
authorities no choice but to make a sweeping investigation of the
matter.355 After some partial reports, a comprehensive report was
finally released in 2007 regarding the laboratory’s operation.356 The
investigation, which reviewed over a thousand cases, uncovered
wrongdoing by nine different crime lab workers.357 The investigation
report pointed to a long list of malfunctions in the police lab’s work,
including: failing to perform appropriate control experiments in DNA
testing; systematically misleading reporting regarding the statistical
significance of DNA matches that were found; failing to report
possibly exculpatory findings in suspects’ favor; experts’
misrepresenting and exaggerating their credentials and training in
court; misleading representation of findings; and even fabricating
findings.358 It was found that these practices had continued for an
entire decade, until exposed on the television program.359 Similar
malfunctioning was exposed at the Illinois state police crime lab and
in the work of Texas forensic pathologist Ralph Erdmann, whose
testimony contributed to at least twenty death penalty convictions
and who was convicted of falsifying autopsies.360
One central problem is that some of the types of evidence
submitted in the past to the court—and, in some cases, that continue
to be presented—are based on forensic methods and techniques that
are entirely unreliable, such as microscopical comparisons of hair,
bite marks on the skin, shoeprints, and voiceprints.361 As clarified in
the 2009 NAS Report, and as many scientists have cautioned in their
354. MICHAEL BROMWICH ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATOR FOR THE
HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT CRIME LABORATORY AND PROPERTY ROOM 5 (June 13, 2007),
http://www.hpdlabinvestigation.org/reports/070613report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SN4-BKYR].
355. Id. at 4.
356. Id. at 1; see also SANGERO, supra note 8, at 108.
357. Bolden, supra note 11, at 418–19.
358. Id. at 418.
359. Thompson, supra note 30, at 1037.
360. Bolden, supra note 11, at 418.
361. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 3.
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work, these identification methods have no scientific grounding, are
not based on data, and are unreliable.362
A second central problem is that the data collected in the
framework of the Innocence Project revealed that the majority (61%)
of expert testimony for the prosecution in cases with false
convictions was invalid and faulty; the experts had presented the
findings of the tests that they had performed misleadingly and
erroneously and had arrived at conclusions in an unscientific
manner.363 This was the case with regard to both the unreliable types
of evidence discussed above as well as reliable scientific evidence,
such as DNA comparisons and serological blood type tests.364
Common to the experts’ errors in their testimonies was their biased
presentation of the forensic evidence as stronger than it truly was in
reality.365
According to Daubert, judges are supposed to be “gatekeepers,”
preventing entry into the courtroom of evidence that is not
scientifically reliable or valid. However, in reality, usually only the
prosecution succeeds in submitting an expert opinion—which is most
often incriminating—because defendants lack the necessary
resources to submit expert opinions in their favor. Because judges do
not have expertise in all of the scientific or pseudoscientific fields
presented to them, they are often misled by the prosecution’s biased
expert opinion, whereas the defense attorney lacks the tools for
refuting it. It is interesting to note that in civil trials, especially tort
lawsuits—which never involve capital cases or human liberty and
tend to revolve solely around matters of money—judges delve far
more deeply into the evidence presented as scientific, and in practice,
actually function as gatekeepers and prevent junk science from being
admitted at trial. How does this happen? In civil law, expert opinions
are often submitted by both parties to the litigation—the plaintiff and
the defendant—which allows the judge to compare and confront the
362.
363.
364.
365.

Id. at 161; SANGERO, supra note 8, at 135.
GARRETT, supra note 7, at 90.
Id.
See id.; see also Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 38, at 20; SANGERO, supra note 8, at 135–36.
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evidence and make a far deeper investigation into its reliability and
validity.366 In criminal law, judges tend to rely on the prosecution’s
experts’ guarantees that they perform their work in line with precise
scientific standards, and tend to rely on the defense attorneys to
expose any imprecision in that work. Both these assumptions are
misplaced.367
An additional problem is that the professional expertise in the
fields examined in crime laboratories is acquired in the framework of
entities associated with the police and prosecution. The experts who
testify at criminal trials are almost always prosecution witnesses and
almost always work for the police. In effect, they see themselves as
part of the law enforcement system and consider their job to be
assisting law enforcement in finding evidence pointing to the
suspect’s guilt. Here, again, we witness the destructive effect of
preconceptions of the suspect’s guilt.368
An extreme example of such an “accomplished” expert was Fred
Zain, the head of the West Virginia state crime lab. The Innocence
Project’s work revealed that Zain would often falsify the results of
tests to fabricate supposedly scientific evidence that would
incriminate suspects.369 An investigation revealed that he had
shamelessly lied in his testimonies as an expert before courts in two
different states in the United States and had manipulated test results
in 134 different cases over thirteen years.370 Moreover, Zain would
often testify in court that he himself had performed the tests when in
fact others had conducted them.371
Forensic experts do not perform their examinations as “blind
tests”—that is, without knowledge of additional information about

366. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 333, at 56; GARRETT, supra note 7, at 91; Kesan, supra note 20,
at 2040.
367. Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 38, at 97; SANGERO, supra note 8, at 136.
368. SANGERO, supra note 8, at 136.
369. Bolden, supra note 11, at 317–18.
370. Id. at 418.
371. See SCHECK ET AL., supra note 333, at 107–25 (providing a more detailed description of the Fred
Zain case); see also Paul C. Giannelli & Kevin C. McMunigal, Prosecutors, Ethics, and Expert
Witnesses, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1494, 1497–98 (2008); SANGERO, supra note 8, at 136–37.
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the investigation—and in fact, police investigators often inform them
on the details of the investigation. It is only natural as human beings
that they are influenced by the knowledge that additional evidence
exists supporting the suspect’s guilt, such as his identification by the
victim, confession to the police, or even an additional piece of
scientific evidence. All tests have the subjective component of the
expert’s assessment and interpretation of the findings. The
knowledge that there are other pieces of evidence against the suspect
is likely to bias the expert toward an incriminating interpretation of
findings that are not unequivocal.372 Moreover, in many cases,
experts have been prevented from performing tests that are likely to
rule out the suspect’s involvement in the crime, and in other cases,
the prosecution withholds from the defense findings pointing to the
defendant’s innocence. In their summations at trial, prosecutors often
present the lab findings in a misleading and erroneous manner, so
that they will be perceived as incriminating.373
Another phenomenon that has emerged is that those experts who
give misleading and erroneous testimony are not merely a few rotten
apples, but are rather quite numerous. According to the findings of
the Innocence Project, from among the 250 first exonerations
obtained in the framework of the Project, 81 different experts
working in 54 different laboratories in 28 different states across the
United States were found to have given faulty expert testimony.374
This should give one pause; consider the thousands of other trials at
which these same experts testified but the convicted defendants have
not been retried and, in all likelihood, will never be retried because,
among other reasons, there are no genetic samples that can be tested
372. GARRETT, supra note 7, at 92; see also Dror et al., supra note 260, at 74 (discussing experts’
biases); Itiel E. Dror et al., When Emotions Get the Better of Us: The Effect of Contextual Top-Down
Processing on Matching Fingerprints, 19 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 799, 799 (2005); Itiel E. Dror,
Cognitive Neuroscience in Forensic Science: Understanding and Utilizing the Human Element, PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 370, 370 (2015); Itiel E. Dror, A Hierarchy of
Expert Performance, 5 J. APPLIED RESEARCH IN MEMORY & COGNITION 121, 121 (2016).
373. GARRETT, supra note 7, at 111–13; see also Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 38, at 34; SANGERO,
supra note 8, at 138.
374. GARRETT, supra note 7, at 93; see Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 38, at 23–24 (providing more
detail).
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in these cases.375 Here, again, we feel the effect of the Hidden
Accidents Principle in criminal law.
Even when (genuine) scientists indicate in their research that
certain methods are in no way scientific and call for an improvement
of laboratory work practices, and even with methods that are
grounded in science (particularly genetic comparisons), forensic
scientists tend to resist the recommendations for improvement. They
are used to the practices they learned in their training, have accepted
them as correct, and followed them for many years; therefore, they
see these suggestions for change as a personal attack that they almost
instinctively attempt to fight.376
Yet, to reduce the number of false convictions that stem from
faulty expert testimony, there is an urgent need for fundamental
changes in this field. This includes separating the forensics lab work
from the police work to enable the lab to conduct forensic testing in
autonomous, objective labs, instituting “blind” expert checks where
the experts do not know that their work is being checked, requiring
that experts base their work on data and provide the courts with
precise data regarding tests’ error rates and adopting additional
changes recommended in the 2009 NAS Report.377
Finally, a technique that is particularly illustrative of junk science
is microscopical hair comparison.378 Herman Douglas May was
seventeen years old in 1988 and had been involved in a few minor
offenses, such as stealing a guitar from a man who alleged owed May
money but who refused to pay him.379 Around the time May stole the
guitar, a burglary was committed during which a woman was
raped.380 The woman identified May as the rapist in what the court

375. GARRETT, supra note 7, at 93; SANGERO, supra note 8, at 138–39.
376. Risinger, supra note 27, at 535; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 442; Mnookin et al., supra
note 233, at 744–60.
377. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 82, 184–89; SANGERO, supra note 8, at 139.
378. Beth Albright & Debbie Davis, Guilty Until Proven Innocent: The Case of Herman Douglas
May, 30 N. KY. L. REV. 585, 594 (2003); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 447.
379. Albright & Davis, supra note 378, at 586–87.
380. Id. at 587–88.
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described as an unfairly suggestive identification procedure.381 At
trial, moreover, the forensic expert gave testimony against May,
according to which hair found at the scene of the crime resembled
May’s hair, based on the expert’s microscopical examination of the
hair samples, and May could thus be the source of the hair at the
crime scene.382 May was convicted, and twelve years later was it
determined that he was not the rapist, only after mitochondrial DNA
testing was performed on both the sperm and hair found at the crime
scene.383 A similar, infamous case is the false conviction of Gary
Dotson for a rape that had never occurred, based on the
microscopical comparison of pieces of hair.384
In twenty-one of the first seventy exonerations in which the
Innocence Project was involved, experts gave erroneous testimony on
the microscopical comparison of hair.385 In a later study, it emerged
that in seventy-five of the Project’s first 250 exonerations, the
convictions had also been based on microscopical comparisons of
hair,386 and in twenty-nine of these cases experts gave erroneous
testimony.387 In eighteen of the cases, moreover, the experts had
grounded their testimony on an individualization claim; that is to say,
that the hair found at the scene of the crime was unique to the
defendant.388 In six of the exoneration cases, mitochondrial DNA
testing ruled out the expert’s assessment of a match between the hair
at the scene of the crime and the defendant’s hair.389

381. Id. at 594. For more on the Supreme Court’s lenient approach to suggestive identification and for
criticism of this case law, see Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification
Procedures and the Supreme Court’s Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later, 33
L. HUM. BEHAV. 1, 1 (2009).
382. See Albright & Davis, supra note 378, at 592.
383. Id. at 599; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 447.
384. See GARRETT, supra note 7, at 84–89. At a later stage, the young woman confessed to having
fabricated the rape and falsely accused Dotson in an attempt to hide from her parents that she had had
consensual sexual relations with her boyfriend (who was not Dotson). She also described the events in a
book she wrote, CATHLEEN C. WEBB & MARIE CHAPIAN, FORGIVE ME (1985).
385. Albright & Davis, supra note 378, at 592; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 447–48.
386. GARRETT, supra note 7, at 90.
387. Id.
388. Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 38, at 47.
389. Id. at 51.
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The method by which hair is microscopically compared has not
changed much over the last century.390 Hair (at times only a sole
strand) found at the crime scene is compared to hair taken from the
suspect.391 Routine practice is to take fifty strands of hair from the
suspect when comparing head hair, and twenty-five pieces of hair
when comparing the hair from another part of the body.392 In the first
stage of the process, the expert makes a number of determinations
with regard to the hair found at the crime scene: whether it is indeed
hair and not some other fiber; whether it is human hair or animal
hair; the part of the body from which the hair comes; the race of the
person to whom the hair belongs; whether the hair has been dyed;
whether the hair fell out naturally at the crime scene or was forcibly
torn out; and whether the hair was cut.393 In the second stage, the
expert examines the hair without using any instrument to determine
its color and structure (straight, wavy, or curly).394 In the third stage,
the expert examines the hair with a microscope and determines a set
of characteristics that are then compared to the same characteristics
of the suspect’s hair.395 These characteristics relate to hair color,
structure, the structure of the hair follicle, and acquired features, such
as cosmetic treatments or flaws in the hair.396
However, these characteristics are not consistent for even one
individual’s hair. And as they can vary on one person, there is a
broad overlap in the characteristics of the hair of different people.
Therefore, this type of comparison between pieces of hair from two
different people often points to an alleged match. In addition, as this
390. Walter F. Rowe, The Current Status of Microscopical Hair Comparisons, 1 SCI. WORLD 868,
869 (2001); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 448.
391. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 157.
392. Id.
393. Paul C. Giannelli, Microscopic Hair Comparisons: A Cautionary Tale, 46 CRIM. L. BULL., no. 3,
2010, art. 7, at 1–2.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Rowe, supra note 390. For more details, see SCI. WORKING GRP. ON MATERIALS ANALYSIS
(SWGMAT), FORENSIC HUMAN HAIR EXAMINATION GUIDELINES 10.1–10.5 (2005)
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016/09/22/forensic_human_hair_examination_guide
lines.pdf [https://perma.cc/GVY8-9TXN] [hereinafter SWGMAT]; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at
448.
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comparison entails subjective determinations, different experts are
likely to arrive, and do arrive, at conflicting conclusions.397 There is
no possibility of determining individuality based on a microscopical
comparison of pieces of hair, and the probabilistic strength of such
evidence is unknown. On this subject, the National Academy of
Sciences stated: “No scientifically accepted statistics exist about the
frequency with which particular characteristics of hair are distributed
in the population. There appear to be no uniform standards on the
number of features on which hairs must agree before an examiner
may declare a “match.’” 398 The same report further stated that “in
cases where there seems to be a morphological match (based on
microscopic examination), it must be confirmed using mtDNA
analysis, microscopic studies alone are of limited probative value.
The committee found no scientific support for the use of hair
comparisons for individualization in the absence of nuclear DNA.”399
Today, a genetic comparison of hair can be performed, which is
very precise and can be used to test the (weak) strength of the
microscopic comparisons conducted in the past. There are two types
of genetic tests.400 The first tests the DNA found in the cell in the
root of the hair.401 This test is the preferred one as, aside from
identical twins, no two people share the same DNA.402 However, the
hair root is often not available for testing.403 In such circumstances,
the second type of test can be performed: mitochondrial DNA
testing.404 The working hypothesis is that mitochondrial DNA is
maternally inherited.405 Were it not for the occurrence of mutations,

397. Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 38, at 49; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 448.
398. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 160.
399. Id. at 161.
400. SWGMAT, supra note 396, at 10.1–10.4; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 449.
401. SWGMAT, supra note 396, at 10.1–10.4; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 449.
402. SWGMAT, supra note 396, at 10.1–10.4.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 16.
405. Alice R. Isenberg & Jodi M. Moore, Mitochondrial DNA Analysis at the FBI Laboratory,
FORENSIC SCI. COMM. 1 (1999), http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/july1999/dnatext.htm#
[http://perma.cc/B6NA-MB99]; Richard E. Giles et al., Maternal Inheritance of Human Mitochondrial
DNA, 77 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6715, 6715 (1980).
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everyone would have identical mitochondrial DNA; but mutations
have led to differentiations across population groups.406 Thus,
mitochondrial testing can rule out the possibility that the suspect
committed the crime, but cannot determine the identity of the actual
perpetrator because many people share the same mitochondrial DNA,
passed on to them through a shared matrilineal line.
The only circumstances in which some probative strength can be
accorded to microscopical hair comparisons is when a suspect can be
ruled out as the perpetrator of the crime.407 The National Academy of
Sciences 2009 report stated the following regarding this possibility:
The results of analyses from hair comparisons typically are
accepted as class associations; that is, a conclusion of a
“match” means only that the hair could have come from
any person whose hair exhibited—within some levels of
measurement uncertainties—the same microscopic
characteristics, but it cannot uniquely identify one person.
However, this information might be sufficiently useful to
“narrow the pool” by excluding certain persons as sources
of the hair. 408
The general consensus is that microscopical hair comparisons are
junk science.409 This realization was possible due to the development
of genetic comparisons, which proved conclusively that
microscopical comparisons are far from being scientific. One of the
lessons that should be learned from this development is the definite
possibility that courts will admit nonscientific evidence as scientific
evidence and even convict based on that evidence. The problem is
that there are still areas in which the courts treat junk science like

406. Isenberg & Moore, supra note 405, at 2.
407. Giannelli, supra note 393, at 2 (“There is also agreement that, with sufficient exemplars, a
person may be excluded as a suspect.”); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 451.
408. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 156.
409. See, e.g., SCHECK ET AL., supra note 333, at 161–63; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 451–
52.
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true science, and there is no possibility of providing compelling proof
(through DNA testing or any other strong, concurred-upon technique)
that the method is not scientific and must not be relied upon in a
criminal trial. This is also the case with voice comparisons and
shoeprint comparisons.410
I have discussed the critical problems with junk science and
elaborated on some of the changes necessary to make forensic
evidence a more precise and scientific field, so as to improve the
factual determinations in criminal trials and prevent judges from
being misled. As an intermediate remedy—until the necessary
fundamental changes are implemented—the courts must be more
rigorous in examining “scientific evidence” brought before them and
not admit dubious evidence warranting the label “junk science.” In
line with the Daubert rule, for a given type of evidence to be
admissible it must meet accepted scientific standards and be reliable,
valid, and testable but, of course, unrefuted. In addition, in light of
past experience, the courts must regard experts testifying before them
with measured suspicion and not put blind faith in their testimony.
To conclude this discussion of the phenomenon of junk science
and its hazards, I would like to propose a simple test that will assist
judges in distinguishing between an area that is most certainly not
scientific and one that could be scientific but must be more deeply
examined in line with the Daubert rule. I call this test the MIT test
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology test). I came up with this test
recently while giving a lecture on “Scientific Evidence versus ‘Junk
Science’” to Israeli judges at a workshop. At the end of the lecture,
the judge who had organized the workshop thanked me and
recounted that because I “go against the flow,” he had deliberated
whether to schedule my lecture at the beginning of the week-long
workshop or at the end. I responded by telling the judges that this
was not the important issue, and what is actually far more relevant is
that almost all of the workshop lecturers were police forensic lab
410. I elaborated on this at length in a coauthored article with Dr. Mordechai Halpert, Sangero &
Halpert, supra note 11.
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practitioners. I suggested to the judges that they learn about scientific
evidence not from police lab technicians but from members of the
academia: professors from the Weizmann Institute of Science or from
the Technion (Israeli Institute of Technology), the Israeli
counterparts of MIT.
The judge who had organized the workshop regretfully noted that
research work is not being conducted at universities in each forensic
field. I immediately proposed the following to the audience of
judges: “This, then, is an easily applied selection test, which can
assist you judges in preventing junk science from entering your
courts: when a piece of so-called ‘scientific evidence’ is submitted to
you but is not researched at the Weizmann Institute or Technion, this
is proof that it is not science!”
I propose that American judges can apply the same test, simply
substituting in MIT for the Weizmann Institute and Technion. Of
course, this does not mean that any alleged expertise based on a field
in which there is meaningful academic work should be automatically
admitted as scientific evidence. But in the absence of academic
interest and work, we can be certain that this is not science. This MIT
test is an easy selection test relative to the Daubert rule, for it avoids
both the complicated application of the Daubert standard and the
embarrassment of the incorrect application of the tests by judges.411
If the courts were to apply such a test, they would never admit as
scientific evidence opinions submitted by charlatan experts with
regard to microscopical hair comparisons and shoeprint comparisons,
nor would they convict and send to prison defendants based on other
junk science evidence.

411. On the incorrect application of the Daubert rule by the courts, see Mnookin et al., supra note
233, at 758 (“[E]ven after Daubert . . . emphasized the need for judicial gatekeeping to assure the
validity of expert evidence in court, most judges confronted with pattern identification evidence have
continued to admit it without restriction. If courts are not going to insist upon better evidence of validity,
if they are instead going to continue to permit forensic scientists to reach extremely strong conclusions
about their own abilities to make identifications, and if legal challenges remain both relatively rare and
generally unsuccessful, then why should the forensic science community consider changing its
practices?”).
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III. Safety Measures
A. Developing Forensic Science Evidence As a Safety-Critical
System
Based on a single piece of DNA evidence that was obtained when
a sample was run through a database, Daryl Mack was convicted of
murder and sentenced to death;412 he was executed on April 26,
2006.413 Yet, as we have seen, there is a possibility, even if low, of
computer software used in the DNA comparison producing erroneous
findings, just as a lab testing error is possible. This is only one
context in which forensic evidence can put the life of an innocent
person at risk. As Dr. Halpert and I have shown elsewhere, any
device used to produce forensic evidence is fundamentally a “safetycritical system” in that it endangers human life.414 Studies have
demonstrated how erroneous scientific evidence occasionally leads to
false convictions, and this is no less catastrophic than a car’s brake
failure. Yet no mandatory regulation is in place—regarding any
forensic evidence whatsoever—to supervise forensic software or
device development in accordance with safety-critical standards,
despite the broad implementation of such regulations in other fields
involving life and death.415
Elsewhere we have shown that the outdated Fly-Fix-Fly method416
is not a sufficient safety system, and that “black box” testing417 does
not suffice either. Thus, it should be mandatory that devices
producing forensic science evidence be developed using safety
methods that are suited to their nature as safety-critical systems.418
However, the greater hazard is that not even the Fly-Fix-Fly method
has been implemented in the criminal justice system.419 When the
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.

Mack v. State, 75 P.3d 803, 803–04 (Nev. 2003); Halpert & Sangero, supra note 2, at 83.
Halpert & Sangero, supra note 2, at 83.
Id.
Id.
Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1297.
Halpert & Sangero, supra note 2, at 83–88.
Id. at 83.
Id. at 85.
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manufacturer of forensic evidence equipment (such as a breathalyzer)
markets a device that occasionally produces erroneous results due to
a design or software defect, the chances that a court will detect the
error are slim. In contrast, an airplane with a safety defect will
necessarily be involved in an accident or incident (a “near miss”) at
some point in time, and the defect will be exposed. This is not the
case with flaws in forensic-evidence-producing devices. If an
innocent defendant is convicted based on erroneous scientific
evidence (assuming that the law allows a conviction to be based on a
single piece of evidence), his claim of innocence will not be
considered a refutation of the reliability of the forensic device, and
the chances of proving a testing error are low. In addition, many view
a conviction to be in and of itself confirmation of the device’s
reliability. Therefore, to prevent or minimize the possibility of errors
in forensic equipment, great precautions must be taken in the design
and manufacturing processes. Due to the Hidden Accidents Principle,
these are the only stages at which there is a reasonable possibility of
discovering and avoiding defects.420
A forensic device developed in accordance with safety-critical
standards can be expected to produce more precise and reliable
scientific evidence.421 To begin with, there will be fewer false
positives; that is, fewer cases in which an innocent suspect or
defendant is implicated by erroneous test results in a crime she did
not commit. In addition, there will be fewer false negatives as well,
in which a test or device erroneously rules out the actual perpetrator
of the crime being investigated. This, of course, would lead to more
efficient criminal law enforcement, making the safety improvement
of forensic devices a win-win situation.
Finally, legislators should enact regulation regarding the
development process of forensic equipment designed to be used by
the criminal justice system.422 An approval requirement should be set
420. As Dr. Halpert and I demonstrated in Halpert & Sangero, supra note 2, at 77–82, the special
legal proceedings in Chun concerning the breathalyzer exemplify this well.
421. Id. at 89.
422. Id. at 93.
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for manufacturers of forensic devices similar to what is required of
manufacturers of medical diagnostic devices.423 Legislators should
also set a rule for the admissibility of evidence produced by a
forensic device in criminal proceedings requiring that the device be
developed and supervised as a safety-critical system.424
B. Other Safety Changes in Scientific Evidence
What changes and reforms must the forensic sciences undergo to
contribute to the legal field without misleading it? Important
recommendations to this end were made in the 2009 NAS Report,425
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL)
report from 2010,426 the Report to the President on Forensic Science
in Criminal Courts from 2016,427 and various other research
studies.428
(1) The 2009 NAS Report recommended establishing a National
Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS),429 with a similar
recommendation made also in the 2010 NACDL report.430
This Institute could be easily integrated into the Safety in the
Criminal Justice System Institute (SCJSI) when
established.431 Whether in the guise of the NIFS or the
general SCJSI, such a federal agency should be tasked with
the following: to set and enforce best practices for forensic
science; to set standards for mandatory accreditation of
forensic laboratories and mandatory certification for forensic
423. Id.
424. Id. at 93–94.
425. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at xix.
426. NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAW. (NACDL), PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO
STRENGTHEN FORENSIC EVIDENCE AND ITS PRESENTATION IN THE COURTROOM 1 (2010),
www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=17775 [https://perma.cc/555G-TDVM] [hereinafter
NACDL-2010 Report].
427. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 130, at 2.
428. Halpert & Sangero, supra note 2, at 93–94; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1322.
429. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 19.
430. NACDL-2010 Report, supra note 426, at 3–4.
431. See supra note 1; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1324.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol34/iss4/8

82

Sangero: Safety from Flawed Forensic Sciences Evidence

2018]

FLAWED FORENSIC SCIENCES EVIDENCE

1211

examiners; to improve research and educational programs; to
establish a standard terminology to be used in reporting and
testing and model laboratories reports; and so on.432
According to the 2016 Report to the President there is
progress in this direction.433
(2) A very important recommendation made in the 2009 NAS
Report was achieving autonomy and objectivity by removing
all public forensic laboratories from the administrative control
of law enforcement agencies.434 In this context, it is crucial to
ensure that all laboratory personnel receive only the minimal
information required for performing the testing and that they
be given no additional details about the suspect (optimally,
they should not even know that the sample has been taken
from a suspect) or about the case that are likely to bias them
in performing the test.435
(3) Some of the more important recommendations in the 2009
NAS Report related to research development: the promotion
of scholarly, competitive peer-reviewed research regarding
the validity of forensic methods and accuracy of forensic
analyses and data collection, as well as research on human
observer bias and sources of human error in forensic
testing.436 In the wake of this report, thirteen different experts,
from both sides of the fence—forensic science professionals
and academic scholars—joined together to write an article
aimed at setting a framework for research culture in the
forensic sciences.437 Their conclusion was as follows:
We all believe that many forms of forensic science
today stand on an insufficiently developed empirical

432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.

Published by Reading Room, 2018

NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 19–22.
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 130, at 125, 131.
NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 24.
See supra notes 219–225 and accompanying text.
NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 19, 22, 24.
Mnookin et al., supra note 233, at 725.
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research foundation. We all believe that forensic
science does not yet have a well-developed research
culture. These disciplines, in our view, need to
increase their commitment to empirical evidence as
the basis for their claims. Sound research, rather than
experience and training, must become the central
method by which assertions are justified.438
In response to the question, “What is a research culture?” the
experts explained that it is:
[A] culture in which the question of the relationship
between research-based knowledge and laboratory
practices is both foregrounded and central. We mean a
culture in which the following questions are primary: What
do we know? How do we know that? How sure are we
about that? We mean a culture in which these questions are
answered by reference to data, to published studies, and to
publicly accessible materials, rather than primarily by
reference to experience or craft knowledge, or simply
assumed to be true because they have long been assumed to
be true.439
To this important explanation, I would add that the need for a culture
of research in forensic science would be clear to all if there were a
culture of safety in the criminal justice system.
(4) Accreditation and certification: There should be mandatory
laboratory accreditation and individual certification of
forensic science professionals.440

438. Id. at 778.
439. Id. at 740.
440. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 25 (Recommendation 7).
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(5) A code of ethics: The 2009 NAS Report recommended that
the NIFS establish a national code of ethics for forensic
science and mechanisms for its enforcement.441
(6) Education and training: The 2009 NAS Report also
recommended taking measures to attract students in the
physical and life sciences to pursuing graduate studies in
multidisciplinary fields critical to the practice of forensic
science. Moreover, law students, law practitioners, and judges
should be encouraged to acquire basic knowledge in these
fields.442
The 2010 report of the NACDL, based on the 2009 NAS Report,
offered more specific and detailed recommendations and added some
new and crucial recommendations.443 These recommendations can be
divided into seven major areas:
(1) The establishment and funding of a central, science-based
federal agency: The primary and central reform suggested is
that Congress establish and allocate funds for a science-based
federal agency, for the purpose of promoting “the
development of forensic science into a field of
multidisciplinary research and practice founded on the
systematic creation, collection, and analysis of relevant data.”
Validated and reliable forensic evidence is an important and
vital component of the criminal justice system, and its
development should be encouraged. Moreover, “[t]he results
of any forensic theory or technique whose validity,
limitations, and measures of uncertainty have not been
established should not be admitted into evidence” in a
criminal trial, and prior admissibility or use of the results of a
forensic discipline, technique, or theory is not conclusive

441. Id. at 26 (Recommendation 9).
442. Id. at 27–28 (Recommendation 10).
443. NACDL-2010 Report, supra note 426, at 3–4.
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proof of their validity or reliability. Accordingly, one of the
agency’s central and immediate priorities should be
generating research programs for determining the validity,
limitations, and measures of uncertainty of forensic theories
or techniques, particularly with regard to forensic evidence
that supposedly identifies any specific individual as being
involved with a crime scene. This was followed by detailed
recommendations regarding staffing, scope of responsibilities,
an accreditation and certification board, and a proficiency
testing program.444
(2) Establishing a culture of science: The principle here is that
“[a] culture of science that encourages independence,
openness, objectivity, error management, and critical review
should be promoted in forensic science practitioners and
facilities.” This culture already exists among many forensic
science practitioners and facilities, but a fundamental
commitment to a culture of science should exist among all
facilities and all practitioners. This was accompanied with
detailed recommendations regarding autonomy, openness,
objectivity, error management, and critical review.445
(3) Setting a national code of ethics: The report expressed the
principle that “[a]ll forensic science practitioners and
supervisors should be required to adhere to a professional
code of ethics that clearly articulates ethical obligations and
contains a meaningful enforcement mechanism.” The detailed
recommendations in this context relate to continuing
education, acknowledgment of subjectivity, disclosure
obligations, and enforcement.446
(4) The institution of a prerequisite of research: The report
recommended establishing and fully funding research
programs relating to the accuracy, reliability, and validity of

444. Id.
445. Id. at 4–6.
446. Id. at 6–7.
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forensic theories and techniques and their limitations and
measures of uncertainty where calculable. This would be led
and conducted principally by credentialed and qualified
scientists at national research institutions with forensic
science practitioners, particularly “those guided by a cultureof-science mindset and with histories of independence from
law enforcement,” as active research participants and
partners. Detailed recommendations were further given
relating to determination of probability associations,
relationships between research studies and case work, critical
review, errors rates, automated techniques, bias minimization,
and documentation.447
(5) Improvement of education: The report noted that legal
professionals generally lack the necessary scientific expertise
and knowledge to understand and assess forensic evidence in
an informed way. Thus, legal practitioners and judges must
receive meaningful education and training “in the
fundamentals of science, statistics, and common forensic
practices; and in the limitations of, and potential forms and
scope of error associated with, those practices.” The detailed
recommendations related to law students, lawyers, and
judges, as well as educational resources.448
(6) The principle of transparency and disclosure: Transparency is
vital to a fair and effective criminal justice system and a
“hallmark of good science.” An attorney’s ability to evaluate,
investigate, present, and confront forensic evidence at trial is
contingent on complete and timely disclosure of information
about the forensic examination, the conclusions of the
forensic science practitioner, and the facility where the
examination was conducted. “In every case involving forensic
evidence, regardless of the current state of the science and/or
advancements made, both the prosecution and the defense
447. Id. at 7–10.
448. Id. at 10–11.
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will require full access to the forensic evidence and
underlying data related to a particular case.” The detailed
recommendations here related to transparency of forensic
facility operations, ethical requirements, disclosure
obligations, access to research and litigants, minimum
disclosure requirements, reports, and databases.449
(7) Allocating defense resources, particularly for indigent defense
services: The principle articulated in this context is that
“[f]orensic reform must be viewed within the framework of
the fundamental constitutional protections established to
ensure fair and accurate verdicts based on trustworthy
evidence and to prevent wrongful convictions.” The
prosecution tends to be the “primary proponent of forensic
evidence,” but defense attorneys also sometimes use forensic
evidence at trial. The report noted that many exonerations of
innocently convicted defendants have been based on forensic
evidence submitted by defense counsel. Defense counsel
should, thus, be able to consult with forensic experts and
experts in related scientific fields to present in court the
scientific limits of the evidence, the results of independent
testing, and the testimony of independent experts when
appropriate. It was therefore recommended that the defense
be ensured the necessary resources for obtaining such
assistance from forensic and scientific experts and for the use
of forensic facilities for independent, confidential testing.
Indigent defendants, like defendants with financial means,
moreover, should be ensured access to assistance from
appropriate experts. The detailed recommendations addressed
the topics of indigent defense, experts, consultation, and
confidential testing.450

449. NACDL-2010 Report, supra note 426, at 11–14.
450. Id. at 14–16.
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The last important report with recommendations is the 2016
Report to the President on Forensic Science in Criminal
Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison
Methods:451
The study that led to the report was a response to
[the President’s] question to [the Council of
Advisors], in 2015, whether there are additional
steps on the scientific side, beyond those already
taken by the Administration in the aftermath of
the highly critical 2009 National Research
Council report on the state of the forensic
sciences, that could help ensure the validity of
forensic evidence used in the Nation’s legal
system. [The Council] concluded that there are
two important gaps: (1) the need for clarity about
the scientific standards for the validity and
reliability of forensic methods and (2) the need to
evaluate specific forensic methods to determine
whether they have been scientifically established
to be valid and reliable.452 [The study] aimed to
help close these gaps for a number of forensic
“feature-comparison”
methods—specifically,
methods for comparing DNA samples, bitemarks,
latent fingerprints, firearm marks, footwear, and
hair.453
Here are some of the recommendations:
(1) It is important that scientific evaluations of the foundational
validity be conducted, on an ongoing basis, to assess the

451. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 130, at 1.
452. Id.
453. Id.
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(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.

[Vol. 34:4

foundational validity of current and newly developed forensic
feature-comparison technologies. To ensure the scientific
judgments are unbiased and independent, such evaluations
should be conducted by an agency which has no stake in the
outcome.454
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
should take a leadership role in transforming three important
feature-comparison methods that are currently subjective—
latent fingerprint analysis, firearms analysis, and under some
circumstances, DNA analysis of complex mixtures—into
objective methods.455
The NIST should improve the Organization for Scientific
Area Committees (OSAC), which was established to develop
and promulgate standards and guidelines to improve best
practices in the forensic science community.456
The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) should
coordinate the creation of a national forensic science research
and development strategy.457
The FBI Laboratory should undertake a vigorous research
program to improve forensic science, building on its recent
important work on latent fingerprint analysis.458
The Attorney General should direct attorneys appearing on
behalf of the Department of Justice to ensure expert testimony
in court about forensic feature-comparison methods meets the
scientific standards for scientific validity.459
Where empirical studies and/or statistical models exist to shed
light on the accuracy of a forensic feature comparison
method, an examiner should provide quantitative information
about error rates. In testimony, examiners should always state

Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 130, at 15.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
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clearly that errors can and do occur, due both to similarities
between features and to human mistakes in the laboratory.460
(8) When deciding the admissibility of expert testimony, federal
judges should consider the appropriate scientific criteria for
assessing scientific validity, including “foundational validity”
and “validity as applied.” Federal judges, when permitting an
expert to testify about a foundationally-valid featurecomparison method, should ensure that testimony about the
accuracy of the method and the probative value of proposed
identifications is scientifically valid in that it is limited to
what the empirical evidence supports. Statements suggesting
or implying greater certainty are not scientifically valid and
should not be permitted. In particular, courts should never
permit scientifically indefensible claims such as: “zero,”
“vanishingly small,” “essentially zero,” “negligible,”
“minimal,” or “microscopic” error rates; “100 percent
certainty” or proof “to a reasonable degree of scientific
certainty;” identification “to the exclusion of all other
sources;” or a chance of error so remote as to be a “practical
impossibility.”461
CONCLUSION
To the important and detailed recommendations made in the 2009
NAS Report, the 2012 NACDL Report, and the 2016 Report to the
President, I would add three general recommendations that
implement three fundamental safety rules, and a fourth, unique
recommendation, which I raised here.
The first safety recommendation is that a legal rule must be set that
precludes convicting on the basis of any single piece of evidence.462
The rationale for this rule is that errors arise in every scientific test
460. Id. at 19.
461. Id.
462. We have seen the tremendous significance of the error rate. See supra Section II.C; see also
Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 43.
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and that the possibility of an error, which is not negligible, prevents
achieving proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when based
solely on a single piece of evidence. The second safety
recommendation relates to regulation: manufacturers of forensic
scientific equipment and forensic labs must be subject to safety
regulation similar to the FDA’s regulation of manufacturers of
medical equipment and medical laboratories. The role of regulating
scientific evidence must be shifted from judges to professional
regulators with expertise in the relevant scientific fields,463 which is a
standard practice in other areas with regard to safety-critical systems.
The third safety recommendation is that those who will engage in
safety in the legal field apply the error-prevention model developed
and refined in the medical diagnostics field, as described above in
section II.C. The fourth safety recommendation is the adoption of the
MIT test I proposed above in discussing the distinction between
scientific evidence and junk science. Under this selection-test, which
would precede the Daubert examination of evidence presented as
scientific, if there is no systematic scientific academic work in the
relevant field, then the evidence is not scientific. Finally, further
recommendations for improving forensic evidence should be
developed by the proposed SCJSI or by the NIFS.
In line with the principles of safety, these recommendations must
not, of course, be assumed to be exhaustive or necessarily well-suited
to their goals. Rather, there is a need to revisit and check them after
they have been implemented and to verify whether each one attains
its objective, all in an attempt for unending improvement, as is the
accepted practice in modern safety.

463. Halpert & Sangero, supra note 2, at 93–94.
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